Police Abuse Cover Up?Victim charged with alledged shoptheft instead!

Sunday, 31 May 2009

• Police Abuse Cover Up?Victim charged with alledged shoptheft instead!

  Please do not believe "those people" when they tell you they are opening up the country,that they are moderating the Internet with a "light touch",that they encourage active discussion and participation etc ad naseum.

  This is what has happened to PoThePanda so far,he believed "those people" and the following happened...

  Chronological Timeline Of Events

  02/03/09(Document 1) --- Receipt Showing My Presence At CID. http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/020309AcknowledgementSlip.jpg

  (Statement 1) --- Illegal Arrest , Unlawful Detention And Various Offences

  committed by CID/ISD.

  http://pothepanda.xanga.com/699871897/officialstatements-in-police-report-over-pothepanda-limkopi-case/

  06/03/09 --- SPF claimed they have a case of shoptheft against me from more than a year ago.

  10/03/09(Document 2) --- Receipt Showing My Presence At CID.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/Documents%20For%20030609/100309PoliceAcknowledgementSlip.jpg

  (Statement 2) --- 2nd meeting with CID/ISD.

  Same URL as Statement 1.Please scroll down.

  13/03/09 --- 1st ever meeting with Mr Chia Ti Lik,Advocater & Solicitor.Released a short

  statement on my blog.

  17/03/09(Document 3) --- Received email from Hardwarezone Administrator/Moderator that

  SPF had requested my thread to be removed and banned as i was lying.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/Documents%20For%20030609/EmailFromHWZMod.jpg

  18/03/09 - 15/04/09 --- Waited for SPF to approach me.

  01/04/09(Statement 3) --- Appeared in Court 3 for PTC.Judge adjourned case but there were 2 persons waiting outside Judge's chambers to take me away.

  Same URL as Statement 1.Please scroll down.

  16/04/09(Document 4) --- Made police report at Paya Lebar NPP.Report number F/20090416/2131.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/Documents%20For%20030609/PoliceReportFiled160409.jpg

  17/04/09(Document 5) --- Emailed CID with statements of 02/03/09,10/03/09 and 01/04/09 and demanded a formal response.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/PrintScreen1.jpg

  17/04/09(Document 6) --- Received auto-reply stating SPF will reply shortly.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/PrintScreen2.jpg

  26/04/09 --- www.wayangparty.com released article about lack of response

  29/04/09 --- Released blogpost and thread in various forums about SPF total lack of reaction.

  29/04/09(Late Night)(Document 7) --- Received a letter from Internal Investigation Department.Letter by a Mr Frankie Yeo (Senior Station Inspector) requesting my assistance in police investigation on the 05/05/09 at 9.30am.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/Documents%20For%20030609/LetterFromMrFrankieYeo290409.jpg

  30/04/09(Document 8) --- Received another letter from a Mr Paul Tan,writing on behalf of the Quality Service Manager(SPF),stating that the investigation will take estimated 2 months.

  http://i692.photobucket.com/albums/vv287/PoThePanda/Documents%20For%20030609/LetterReceivedMrPaulTan300409.jpg

  01/05/09 - 03/05/09 --- Public Holiday + Weekend

  04/05/09 --- Called IID and left voicemail that i had a court attendance on the exact same day and

  time that they arranged for the interview.

  05/05/09(Statement 4) --- Was contacted by IID Mr Frankie Yeo to attend interview the next

  day.Mr Chia was denied permission to accompany me.

  06/05/09(Statement 5) --- Interview with Mr Frankie Yeo at IID.Was told investigation needs

  2 months.Was informed,"We cannot produce the policemen in

  public because we cannot control what they say."

  http://pothepanda.xanga.com/701694483/statement-of-060509/

  25/05/09 --- Was produced in court for PTC,alledged by SPF to have committed shoptheft more than a year ago.When Mr Chia Ti Lik requested to have the 4 policemen to be presented as witnesses in order to dispel any doubts about the integrity,honesty and authenticity of the "evidence" in the case,the request was denied.

  Trial has been set for Court 6,Subordinate Courts,for the 3rd of June 2009 at 0930 hours.

  How do you defend a case where your witnesses are denied?

  Where your witnesses may have been detained by the Prosecuting Agency because the Prosecuting Agency "cannot control what they say"?

  This is what you get when you believe in "regulating the New Media with a "light" touch.

  This is what you get when you actively participate in discussions and generate new ideas,which may not go down well with certain Elitist elements.

  How many other Netizens have gone missing?Or killed?Or was fixed?

  What do you do? :(

http://pothepanda.xanga.com/703351636/police-abuse-cover-upvictim-charged-with-alledged-shoptheft-instead/

http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=30184.2

ever heard of “upturn the downturn” song?

ever heard of “upturn the downturn” song? here’s one.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQKIOhBciJ8

in this downturn, the workers can’t feel sad.

when its upturn, we will all be glad.

go for help and e2i

or call union hotline

cut costs save jobs good for Singapore

With some help from SPUR and Jobs Credit

you can fight adversity

for you, from you

let us stand in pride and unity

we are pro-workers oi oi

we are pro business oi oi

Upturn the downturn.

this is completely hilarious. rhetoric and propaganda at its best.

firstly, since when does a workers’ union represent BUSINESSES?

secondly, luckytan rightly pointed out here. how the hell does a union be pro-worker and pro-business at the same time? these two are mutually exclusive. NTUC and Mr Lim are indeed weaving some magic and selling snake oil through singing.

They really take Singaporeans as fools. and guess what? the screaming and cheering during the performance makes me really nauseous. “this is so creative! do you want to hear moreeeeeee?” government propaganda machine working over time eh? such things seem like a scene directly out of 1984 or Stalin’s USSR.

Here’s some suggestions for free Mr Lim. Forget the costs incurred in erm hosting such dinners. What you should do right now is to talk to retrenched workers, and find out how to directly help them and their family, either through food vouchers or groceries vouchers. I think this is much more important than singing upturn the downturn.

wayang oh wayang. like one of the commentors on the video, I’ve never seen so many MPs making a fool out of themselves. I guess Singaporeans are the biggest fools of all. They vote MPs who make a fool out of themselves into Parliament. sighs.

http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=30049.1

On Tharman's comments about Temasek, and more

On Tharman's comments about Temasek, and more

Singapore's Minister of Finance, Mr. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, has spoken in Singapore's parliament about Temasek's performance to date. The Straits Times reported the news with an article titled "Temasek beats returns of many big funds" and stating that there has been a gain of S$114 billion in the five years before the fall, and a gain of S$56 billion after losses. They also reported in the article that Temasek thus averaged slightly over 15% annually over the five year period. That just sounds heartwarming, doesn't it?

But a look at other news sources, namely from the Asian Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg news show that Temasek had gained S$114 billion over five years (from 2003 to 2008), and proceeded to lose half, no, more than half of that sum (S$58 bilion) in a mere eight months (from March 2008 to November 2008).

The Asian Wall Street Journal has a graphical representation that pretty much says it all.

On reading all these articles, there are two contentious points about Mr. Tharman's defense of Temasek: firstly about Temasek's performance vis-a-vis benchmarks, and secondly about the assertion that it is not realistic for Temasek to avoid losses amid sharp market corrections.

Temasek's performance: one eyed man in the land of the blind, or the Toyota behind the Ferraris?

Tharman defended Temasek's performance, stating that Temasek has performed "respectably" compared to relevant market indexes and reputable institutional investors. The article quotes Tharman as saying

"Temasek has achieved total shareholder returns of ..... slightly over 15% per year on average over the cycle. This compares with 6% annualised gain in the global equity market indices (MSCI World)... Temasek's annualised returns are also higher than what several other well-regarded investors have earned over the cycle."

A question for Minister: which "well-regarded investors" have Temasek beaten, and how did the whole population of these "well-regarded investors" do as a whole? For instance, if Temasek is comparing itself with its sovereign-wealth fund peers, then Temasek's performance is excellent in the same way that a Toyota Camry will hugely outperform an East German Trabant on a racetrack. Soveregn wealth funds on the whole have been performing badly, based on a few abstracts on academic studies that I was able to find via Google: a working draft here, and here. This paper's abstract states that the sovereign wealth funds they studied showed an average annual return of -14% over two years, whereas Temasek's returns over a two year period is probably slightly positive. By using this benchmark, Temasek is the one-eyed man in the land of blind investors, and has truly done well.

But the same Toyota Camry mentioned above will be sorely lacking if it was benchmarked against a Ferrari on the same racetrack. You might ask, "which institutional investor can be considered an investing Ferrari?" As I'd written before, the Yale Endowment fund has been hugely successful over this same period of time that Temasek has mentioned, and their portfolio's returns are a lot less volatile. Just compare the respective portfolio values in the following two pictures:

Temasek's portfolio value until 2008

Yale endowment's portfolio market value until 2008

Both are linearly scaled on the vertical axis, and are thus comparable by eyeball. Look closely at Temasek's portfolio, and notice how there was a HUGE 40% drawdown from 2000 to 2003; in contrast, Yale's fund went from around US$11-12 bn to $10bn, which represents a mere 10-20% decline, while their bounce up has been just as spectacular (they more than doubled from 2003 to 2008). Graphically you can see that Yale's returns are much better adjusted for risk.

We should also bear in mind that Temasek had the benefit of privatizing government-linked corporations, which were basically state monopolies: much of the gains in their portfolio's market value stemmed from all these one-off initial public offerings, as can be seen from the notation on Temasek's chart. In contrast, Yale's performance stems from pure investment returns, diversified over different asset classes which even out its returns.

From this perspective, Temasek's returns might not be that fantastic, especially relative to the risks involved.

The question then begs to be asked: are we comparing Temasek with the blind, or with the best-in-class Ferraris?

Temasek's portfolio: diversify or die

Minister also said in the article that it was not realistic for Temasek to outperform the market everytime or to avoid losses amid sharp market corrections.

I think any sane person will not expect Temasek to outperform the market everytime: if even the God of All Investors (i.e. Warren Buffett) occasionally lags the Dow (especially just before 2000), it is extremely unrealistic to expect Temasek to outperform the market all the time.

But what we can and should expect is for Temasek to reduce its losses during sharp market corrections like now, even as they seek higher returns. As I said before here, Temasek's portfolio is extremely concentrated in terms of asset class and geography.

A friend critiqued my argument by stating that given Temasek's size, it is not exactly fair to compare Temasek with Yale's endowment fund, which is a fifth of Temasek's size. But I think he misses the main point: if a smaller fund like Yale's can diversify across 6-7 different asset classes while pursuing high returns like Temasek's mandate, does it make sense for a fund of Temasek's size to remain as concentrated as it is in a single asset class in its pursuit of returns?

For naysayers about Temasek's ability to diversify, bear in mind that Temasek's sister firm, the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore, or GIC is actually quite spread out across different asset classes, including Treasuries, currencies, and fixed income (see page 11 of GIC's annual report here). GIC's mandate is quite different from Temasek's: their aim is basically to just beat global inflation, which explains why their returns are much lower, and their diversification into alternative assets is too small to make much difference to the portfolio on the whole (e.g. Emerging Market equities are just 10%, Absolute Return strategies make up just 3% of the portfolio, Natural Resources a mere 2%, and Private Equity just 8%). Should Temasek adopt a similar policy of asset diversification, these alternative asset classes should probably take up a larger portion of Temasek's portfolio in pursuit of higher returns.

GIC's broad diversification across different asset classes shows that a large sovereign wealth fund like Temasek can diversify into different asset classes. It really makes me wonder why Temasek is sticking only to equities: in a pursuit for returns, it almost seems reckless not to diversify especially when you are a giant, especially since it will boost your risk adjusted returns and reduce the chance of being aversely affected by Black Swan events. It is not for nothing that Harry Markowitz called diversification "the only free lunch", one which Temasek is basically not having by being hugely concentrated in equities (especially in financial institutions).

A question of corporate governance?

While researching for this blog post, I was looking through GIC's annual report for 2007-2008, and what struck me was the composition of GIC's board of directors and their advisors: it is fairly obvious that GIC is aggressively tapping into some very sharp financial minds, as their board advisers include a number of heads of investment fund and investment advisory firms. One of them is even chairman of Goldman Sachs' Quantitative Investment Strategies Group.

In contrast, Temasek's board mostly consists of ex-CEOs, who often don't have the necessary appreciation of finance or financial risk. Last time I counted, I counted two chaps with relevant financial/investment expertise on Temasek's board: one was a lawyer who also works in an investment firm, while the other is a member of the Swedish Wallenberg family.

This difference might account for the different asset allocation strategies by the two firms. While Temasek has done well, in my personal opinion there is definitely scope for more improvement. Perhaps it is time for Mr. Tharman and the Minstry of Finance to look more closely at Temasek's board composition, and to model it more after GIC by injecting more experienced financiers, or at least to create a board of advisors to Temasek's Board. Afterall, financial investing is a very different ball game from buying over a company as a CEO.

(Incidentally, Minister is also on GIC's Board. One can only hope he has been tapping GIC's board advisors on the matter of Temasek's investments...)

Time to look more closely at Temasek's risks

In summary, I basically disagree with Mr. Tharman about his statements on Temasek, and think that Temasek ought to implement certain changes. More clarity is needed on the type of benchmarking that is used to gauge Temasek's performance, and I think a closer look needs to be taken on the risks that Temasek is taking on.

Given the Singapore government's general risk aversion (we have one of Southeast Asia's strongest militaries, despite being one of the smallest nations in the region) and preparations for foreseeable risks and contingencies, I find it puzzling that the approach towards Temasek's portfolio risk seems to be verging on indifference. There is a saying amongst traders that "if you look after the risk, the returns will take care of themselves".

If we persist with the current attitude towards Temasek's portfolio concentration and other risks, then it won't be long before the S$56 billion portfolio gain evaporates into nothingness. Solon's warning still rings true. I think it is high time for us to look closely at Temasek's strategy, and to take steps like diversification to reduce the risks to Singapore, and changing their board composition

http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29004.58

Don't Follow Singapore's Lead

Don't Follow Singapore's Lead
Saturday, May 23, 2009

William J. Dobson's take on the rehabilitation of terrorism suspects in Singapore borders on the propagandistic ["The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore," Outlook, May 17]. He wrote that since 2001, 40 former terrorists have been rehabilitated and released.

To be clear, the suspects are held under the Internal Security Act (ISA), the same act that has "rehabilitated" and "released" more than 100 opposition members, journalists, human rights advocates and trade union leaders, as well as a group of lawyers, Catholic Church workers and social activists for seeking to "violently overthrow" the Singapore government through a Marxist network. The fact that not a shred of evidence has been presented against these detainees doesn't seem to bother Mr. Dobson.

Such a rehabilitation program has been so successful that there is no political opposition or civil society to speak of in Singapore. Of course, as in Guantanamo, rehabilitation in Singapore comes with beatings and other forms of torture. A few people have been reported to have died in Singapore's cells. But unlike with Guantanamo, there is no debate on the detentions because there is no free press and free speech in my country.

Unlike with Guantanamo, there can be no change in the government that administers the ISA because Singapore is not a democracy. And unlike with Guantanamo, there is no one and no institution here to intervene on behalf of the detainees. You stand guilty as accused until the accuser "rehabilitates" you.

Mr. Dobson describes the regime in Singapore as a strict law-and-order government because it bans chewing gum. Banning chewing gum is the least of our problems. The government recently passed the Public

Order Act, which effectively bans even one individual from carrying out a protest. This is not strictness, it is repression.

Look to Singapore? Mr. Dobson should be careful what he wishes for.

CHEE SOON JUAN

Secretary-General

Singapore Democratic Party

Singapore

http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=30872.3

The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore.

The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore.

By William J. Dobson
Sunday, May 17, 2009

What to do with the Guantanamo detainees? Uncertainty resurfaced last week, as the Obama administration backed away from earlier statements on U.S. anti-terrorism policies. The president reversed a decision to release photographs of alleged detainee abuse. Then he decided to keep the military commissions for trying terrorist suspects. The White House is now reportedly considering plans to detain some suspects on U.S. soil indefinitely, without trial.

As the administration struggles over the fate of the 241 remaining detainees in its charge, it may want to look to an old Asian ally for a hand.

Meet Ustaz Ibrahim Kassim, one of Singapore's most respected Islamic scholars. His business card describes him as "Assistant Registrar of Muslim Marriages." But Kassim is engaged in a more important enterprise. He is part of his country's innovative program to fend off the threat of Islamic extremism. "We are not scared of [the terrorists]," says Kassim, an older gentleman with a face framed by a neatly trimmed white beard. "We know that history repeats itself, but these problems do not need to be passed on."

Kassim, along with nearly 40 other Islamic scholars, is part of a select group of religious leaders called the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which is trying to rehabilitate -- or, as its members say, "deprogram" -- Singapore's terrorist detainees. In 2001, Singapore's authorities had no idea that they had a terrorist problem. But after the Sept. 11 attacks, the government was tipped off that a cell of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian militant group with links to al-Qaeda, was planning attacks across the city-state. In raids in late 2001 and 2002, more than 30 members of the terrorist outfit were arrested; more arrests followed. So, while the United States was filling its detention center at Guantanamo with foreign fighters, Singapore began to house its own population of Muslim extremists in its jails.

Singapore's strict law-and-order government, which famously enforced a ban on chewing gum, may seem an unlikely candidate for believing terrorists could be reformed. But Singapore -- often referred to as "the little red dot" in Southeast Asia's Islamic sea -- is in a precarious position, and its government felt compelled to take action that would not only disrupt the terrorist group's operations, but also counter its ideological appeal. "We are what we are out of necessity," says Singapore's Foreign Minister George Yeo. "[Islamic extremism] is a long-term problem, and it's not going to go away in our lifetime. The only way you can combat it is to have an immune system."

Singaporean officials said they decided to use Islamic clerics because they were convinced that only religious leaders could "de-program" the detainees. "Once you have taken an oath of God, it will take another man of God to undo it," a senior security official told me.

After meeting several detainees and studying Jemaah Islamiyah's religious ideology, the Islamic scholars were disturbed to see how their faith had been distorted to recruit terrorist foot soldiers. During more than a thousand weekly hour-long sessions, the scholars worked to build personal relationships with the detainees. Some counselors said the process of de-radicalizing an extremist was similar to the one-on-one relationship that often exists between a terrorist recruiter and recruit.

The main battles were over the Koran. Islamic radicals, especially members of Jemaah Islamiyah, many of whom are born-again Muslims who adopted their extreme faith late in life, often quote from it to justify their actions. That was where a scholar's grasp of Islam came in, and it wasn't always a pleasant exchange. "They believe they have the right to kill. This is what they believe from years of indoctrination," says Ustaz Feisal Hassan, one of the counselors.

As with the rehabilitation of any criminal, there's always the possibility of backsliding. Two graduates of Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program have reportedly taken leadership positions within al-Qaeda in Yemen. For this reason, the RRG also counsels the detainee's family to ensure that wrong lessons are not passed on to the next generation and to help wives, sons and daughters assimilate into the mainstream. Many families receive financial support from the government, and detainees have jobs waiting for them when they are released.

Sidney Jones, a longtime advocate for human rights in Southeast Asia now at the International Crisis Group, calls this aspect of the Singapore program a "stroke of genius."

"In some places, like Poso [in Indonesia], I have heard it is the wives who urge their husbands not to work with the police and to keep their resolve," says Jones. And unlike in many other countries with terrorist rehabilitation programs, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the detainees in Singapore are required to continue their counseling after their release.

Today, 40 former terrorists, or roughly two-thirds of the detainees Singapore has arrested since 2001, have been rehabilitated and released. None appear to have returned to their violent past. For Singaporean authorities, the best dividend may be the trust they have gained from the city-state's own Muslim citizens. "Singapore is the one place in the world I know where relations between the government and the Muslim community are better after 9/11," says Alami Musa, the president of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

Of course, the biggest question is how we can ever know if a radical is truly rehabilitated. A detainee in Singapore is not released until his case officer, a psychologist and the religious counselor signs off. Even then the decision goes to the prime minister's cabinet to give its approval. Political accountability rests at the top.

Members of the RRG have traveled to Iraq to brief U.S. military officers on their methods. At a meeting in Singapore earlier this year, Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone Jr., who used to run the U.S. military's detention system in Iraq, said that 15 percent of Iraqi militants would typically return to the fight once released. Since the U.S. military introduced its own rehabilitation program, inspired in part by Singapore's example, that figure has dropped to 1 to 2 percent.

As the Obama administration contemplates what to do with the detainees who remain in Guantanamo, perhaps they should consider talking with Ustaz Ibrahim Kassim. I have his business card.

wdobson@carnegieendowment.org

William J. Dobson is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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If China loses faith, the dollar will collapse

If China loses faith, the dollar will collapse

By Andy Xie

Published: May 5 2009 03:00 | Last updated: May 5 2009 03:00

Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency. The trigger is the US Federal Reserve's policy of expanding the money supply to prop up the banking system and its over-indebted households. Because the magnitude of the bad assets within the banking system and the excess leverage of its households are potentially huge, the Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyperinflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets in their foreign exchange reserves.

The chatter over alternatives to the dollar mainly reflects the unhappiness with US monetary policy among the emerging economies that have nearly $10,000bn (€7,552bn, £6,721bn) in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. Any other country with America's problems would need the Paris Club of creditor nations to negotiate with its lenders on its monetary and fiscal policies to protect their interests. But the US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world's dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors' concerns for now without worrying about a dollar collapse.

The faith of the Chinese in America's power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar's global status. Ethnic Chinese, including those in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets. You have to check the asset allocations of wealthy ethnic Chinese to understand the dollar's unique status.

The Chinese love of the dollar began in the 1940s when it held its value while the Chinese currency depreciated massively. The renminbi remains a closed currency and is not yet a credible vehicle for wealth storage.

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers rather than printing money. The $2,000bn fiscal deficit, for example, could have gone to over-indebted households for paying down debts instead of dubious spending to prop up the economy. When property and stock prices decline sufficiently, foreign demand, especially from ethnic Chinese, will come in volume. America's vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off.

The global environment is extremely negative for savers. The prices of property and shares are not yet good value and may decline further. Interest rates are near zero. The Fed is printing money, which will inflate away the value of dollar holdings. Other currencies are not safe havens either. As the Fed expands the money supply, it puts pressure on other currencies to appreciate. This will force other central banks to expand their own money supplies to depress their currencies. Hence major currencies may take turns devaluing. The end result is inflation and negative real interest rates everywhere. Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers. Diluting Chinese savings to bail out failing US banks and bankrupt households will eventually destroy the dollar's status. Ethnic Chinese demand for it is waning already. China's bulging foreign exchange reserves reflect the lack of private demand for the US currency.

US policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. For the past two decades its entry into the global economy rested on providing cheap labour to multinationals and pegging the renminbi to the dollar. The dollar peg allowed it to leverage the US financial system for its international needs, while domestic finance re-mained state-controlled to redistribute prosperity from the coast to the interior. This dual approach has worked well. China could have its cake and eat it. Of course, the global credit bubble was what allowed the approach to be effective; its inefficiency was masked by bubble-generated global demand.

China is aware it must become independent from the dollar at some point. Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects its anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The US will not pay attention to something so distant. However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse.

The writer is an independent economist based in Shanghai and former chief economist for Asia Pacific at Morgan Stanley

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