Monday, July 6, 2009

Singapore through a 700-year lens

S’pore through a 700-year lens

By Derek Heng, For The Straits Times, 30/06/09

SINGAPORE’S mainstream history until recently has been confined largely to a story that commenced in 1819 with the arrival of British colonialism and therefore the modern era, with the implication being that there was only a mere sleepy fishing village before that.

Research over the last two decades has, however, uncovered significant material – both textual and archaeological – that sheds substantial light on Singapore’s port-cities between the late 13th and 17th centuries, and the international history of Singapore’s waterways between the 16th and early 19th centuries.

These developments have enabled historians of Singapore to reconstruct aspects of Singapore’s pre-modern history.

The key findings are summarised in a book, Singapore: A 700-year History – From Early Emporium To World City, written by historians Kwa Chong Guan and Tan Tai Yong of the National University of Singapore, and myself, published by the National Archives of Singapore (available in bookstores at the end of next month). This narrates Singapore’s history over the longue duree, giving a continuous account from the late 13th century.

Yet, the question remains to be asked: Does Singapore have a 700-year history? And more importantly, why should Singaporeans in the 21st century be concerned about events that occurred more than half a millennium ago? How can the pre-modern past be relevant to our present-day experiences?

Singapore: A 700-Year History puts forth the central argument that the Singapore of today is very much the same as it has been throughout its documentable history: a port-city par excellence.

If one were to put aside the apparent differences in ethnic composition, ancestry, and contextual issues such as technology, a longer chronological perspective can accord us a better understanding of the present social, economic and cultural state of affairs in Singapore.

Take demographics. Presently, approximately one-quarter of the population comprises foreigners. Why is there such a large contingent of foreigners? How unique is this in Singapore history? How should citizens view the presence of so large a group of foreigners in their midst?

One common way of framing this issue has been to argue that our forebears were immigrants who came during the British colonial era, and so we should continue to be accepting of new citizens and foreigners in our midst. Yet this may dilute the notion of exclusivity of a nation-state, particularly since most Singaporeans have been domiciled in Singapore for many generations.

Extending our perspective into the pre-modern past opens up new dimensions. What we then see is the recurring theme of manpower challenges that societies in our immediate region have faced over the centuries, borne out of the absence of a large indigenous population, creating the need to co-opt foreigners of exceptional ability to contribute to the well-being of society. This has been a constant imperative for Singapore’s successive societies over the centuries.

Indeed, Asian port-cities, whether pre-modern, colonial or present-day, have had populations that are multiethnic, highly mobile and constantly renewed by inward migration. Today’s practice of including foreigners, particularly those of exceptional talent, as a critical part of Singapore’s population is part of a longer history of such practices by port-cities in the region. Indeed, understanding Singapore’s past from a 700-year perspective gives us a more nuanced understanding that our situation as a small country finding its way in a harsh asymmetrical world order is not just a post-1965 reality.

As a small port-city, Singapore’s fortunes have waxed and waned with the vicissitudes of history – but it has so far been able to reinvent itself to stay relevant into the 21st century.

The triumphalist narrative of Singapore’s 20th century success against the odds due to the visionary foresight of great leaders past and present has to be viewed against the historical backdrop of Singapore’s past successes. Modern Singapore’s resounding success has to be understood against the historical milieu, with the options available to these leaders determined by larger forces beyond their control or influence.

As an example, Sri Tri Buana (or Sang Nila Utama) could found Temasek in the late 13th century because the nature of China’s maritime economy then – with large numbers of Chinese merchants and ships arriving in South-east Asia to trade – fostered the proliferation of ports that met the needs of this highly mobile Chinese procurement network.

This network was in turn sustained by a large demand for South-east Asian natural products in China. Such a context did not exist prior to the 13th century. Conversely, Temasek became depopulated by the early 15th century because China, by then under a new political regime (Ming dynasty), no longer permitted Chinese traders to move or trade abroad freely, and instead appointed Malacca as the junior partner in its interactions with the region under a newly instituted tributary system. These changes in the policies of China, historically a first-tier state in Asia, were often motivated primarily by internal concerns, but ultimately had international ramifications, particularly on small Asian countries.

Clearly, such drastic changes through the centuries have required Singapore’s leaders to exercise great intelligence in making choices that will enable the country to adapt to the new circumstances.

However, the lesson that may be learnt from Singapore’s long history is that a resultant improvement in the country’s state of affairs is not necessarily a given. Indeed, its very nature as a port-city dictates that the island’s survival and prosperity are completely dependent upon external economies, cycles and even international politics.

Such a historical reality may seem dire to many Singaporeans. However, a number of optimistic points may be noted. First, Singapore as an independent city-state is not a historical anomaly, but is in fact our historical tradition and legacy. Since independence in 1965, Singapore has been resuming its traditional role as an Asian port-city, and may be seen as the late 20th/early 21st century successor of a series of port-cities that existed in the region since the first millennium AD.

Second, such an exercise, encapsulated in the book Singapore: A 700-Year History, is living proof that the Singapore Story is not cast in stone.

The story shared by Singaporeans who lived through the post-colonial era has been one viewed through the traumatic lens of colonial betrayal, ethnic tension and separation from the Malay Peninsula hinterland. Post-1965 Singaporeans have no notion of such trauma in their social consciousness, and are instead having to constantly compete in the global arena. This group may find immediate association with a Singapore Story in which successive generations have had, over centuries, to negotiate the vagaries of larger regional and international forces.

In this regard, the Singapore Story is a collective social narrative that can, and should be, owned by each successive generation of Singaporeans. It is the hope of the authors that the book would be a contribution to this collective endeavour.

The writer is an assistant professor at the Department of History, Ohio State University, in the United States.


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700 years of Singapore history? Part II: Politicising history

700 years of Singapore history? Part II: Politicising history
By Psellus, on July 5th, 2009

The superficial similarities between the old ports of Temasek and the modern port of Singapore – once we exclude the ‘apparent differences in ethnic composition, ancestry, and contextual issues such as technology’ (i.e. by excising most of the concerns of most other historians) – are supposed to ‘accord us a better understanding of the present social, economic and cultural state of affairs in Singapore’.

Extending our perspective into the pre-modern past opens up new dimensions. What we then see is the recurring theme of manpower challenges that societies in our immediate region have faced over the centuries, borne out of the absence of a large indigenous population, creating the need to co-opt foreigners of exceptional ability to contribute to the well-being of society. This has been a constant imperative for Singapore’s successive societies over the centuries.

Today’s practice of including foreigners, particularly those of exceptional talent, as a critical part of Singapore’s population is part of a longer history of such practices by port-cities in the region.

Forgive me for thinking this all sounds a little familiar.

None of it, strictly speaking, is untrue (I think). However, using history in such a manner is both historically and politically mistaken. Historically speaking, it commits the same port-city error by treating superficially similar, but horribly anachronistic phenomena as though they were somewhat the same thing, as synchronic occurrences of the same archetype: ‘immigration’, and ‘foreign talent’. There is a false equivalence being made between the often-transient settlement of Chinese and Bugis merchants in earlier centuries, settling in a very different society (a Malay trading princedom) and the immigrants and foreign workers coming into Singapore today.

It is precisely the context which makes all the difference. Here I must admit to my ignorance on pre-modern Southeast Asian societies. To the best of my knowledge however, Temasek ruled by a hereditary prince, who would gain most of his income from customs from the goods in transit, and who owed little to the mass of his subjects (he had few native ones to begin with!) and asked for little in return. Modern Singapore is a republic and a nation: it is a polity with an extensive social contract. It demands a lot from its citizens for its survival (taxation, military service) and in return grants them the benefits of this citizenship (protection, education, social security (hhmm), elections (hhhmmmmmm)). This is what Heng refers to as ‘the exclusivity of the nation-state’.

The Malay city-state was not a nation. There may have been a distinction between local and foreign, but one between citizen and non-citizen did not exist. A merchant who followed the flow of trade and settled in Temasek, providing revenue for the prince and his hangers-on, was obviously welcome. (After all, he could just turn up without having applied for a passport or a work-permit and without having his suitability assessed by a bureaucracy either. In many ways the past, without exclusive nation-states or borders, was a more mobile world than our contemporary one.) The prince’s subjects were by and large not consulted. Issues such as assimilation, resentment, the fear of non-citizens reaping the benefits of citizenship without incurring the costs (remember – there was no National Service in the 14th century!), the depression of wages, the competition for jobs (most people, presumably, had a subsistence level of existence anyway) did not exist or were not quite as important.

‘Immigration’ and ‘foreign talent’ in the 14th century are not the same things as they were in the 21st. In the former case it consisted of foreign merchants and their agents following the trade flows and settling (often temporarily) in places where it was convenient to manage their goods. In the latter case foreigners enter the country – after the appropriate bureaucratic authorisation – to look for jobs, whether as researchers, teachers, managers, or construction workers. To equate the two as ‘responses to manpower challenges’ would be an egregious mistake. It helps us understand neither the nature of historical migration, nor the issues engendered by modern migration.

But far more dangerous and more insidious is its political aspect. It seems to me – I’m not sure if other people will share this view, since there is a certain element of plausible deniability – that by placing present government policy within a ‘tradition’ Heng is implying that policy can and should be justified by tradition, and that what worked (though, as we have established, the ‘what’ consists of two very different phenomena) in an entirely different context would continue to work today.

I am mostly supportive of our government’s foreign talent and immigration policy. But I hold this view from a consideration of the contemporary issues engendered by contemporary political debate, and from weighing up the pros and cons of the policy. Simplistically subsuming present-day issues with historical ones under an archetypal ‘manpower challenges’ framework adds nothing to contemporary policy debate, and if anything encourages us to sidestep the complex issues involved.

Like the next historian I am more than happy to bring history into any contemporary social or political debate, to give it some context. Yet here I am pretty much stumped: the introduction of a 700-year narrative history doesn’t seem to add anything new. If anything it is used here to encourage simplistic discussion of pressing contemporary issues and justify trite old conclusions. Sadly, in this case, ‘extending our perspective into the pre-modern past’ has not opened up any ‘new dimensions’ – whether historically, or politically – at all.


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700 years of Singapore history? Part I: The longue durée, geography, and Singapore’s port

700 years of Singapore history? Part I: The longue durée, geography, and Singapore’s port

Right. Been busy for the past few weeks, apologies for the lack of activity here. Hopefully that is about to change.

To start us off again: an interesting article in the ST, which Juwel flagged. It is an article well worth reading. (I’ve saved it on this page because one requires an ST subscription to read it on the original site.)

I am, of course, hugely excited about the publication of a book about pre-modern Singapore, a topic which, as the article claims correctly, has rarely been covered in much detail anywhere, especially in school (though through no fault of the education system). This is largely the result of a paucity of sources, and the historical discontinuity between the medieval Singapura and the port which Raffles founded.

However, I’m uneasy about certain aspects of the article, mainly about the claims that it makes about the relationship between Singapore’s distant past and its present. However because I have a lot to say about this, and because long web articles makes heads swim (I suffer from it too!) I shall break this up into a few parts. Here’s the first:

The Longue Durée

Let’s begin with some generalities. Heng uses the term ‘the longue durée’.* Without going too much into historiography, the concept was introduced by a French school of historians collectively known as the Annales, and in particular Fernand Braudel. Braudel advocated the study of history over extremely long periods of time in order to discern the relationships between geography, social and cultural institutions, and events. To him time moved in three different speeds: at the deepest level stood the hardly-changing limitations and cycles of climate and geography (which he termed structure); the middle tier of human societies, cultural structures, and institutions (conjoncture); and the surface froth of events (événementielle). Many have seen the longue durée as an apology for geographical determinism, with conjoncture and événementielle inevitably controlled by structure. Indeed, Braudel was somewhat of a determinist; in his magnum opus on early modern Europe, Le Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II, he wrote:

Tout effort à contre-courant du sens profond de l’histoire… est condamné d’avance… Ainsi suis-je toujours tenté devant un homme, de le voir enfermé dans un destin qu’il fabrique à peine, dans un paysage qui dessine derrière lui et devant lui les perspectives de la longue durée.

(All efforts made to go against the deepest currents of history… are doomed in advance… Thus I am always tempted, when put before a man, to see him as one imprisoned within a destiny which he hardly creates, in a path which lays out behind him and before him the perspectives of the longue durée.)

There is much merit to this idea. Braudel illustrates, for instance, that the size of Mediterranean empires was limited by the speed of communications. In a more modern use of the longue durée, Jared Diamond has illustrated that the relative lack of biodiversity – especially in the crucial starchy grasses and large domesticable mammals – led to a late start in agriculture for native American civilisations compared to those in Eurasia, and thus the differential rates of development between the two continents. The use of the longue durée thus aids in the formulation of plausible hypotheses to account for certain ‘big questions’ in history, particularly pre-modern history, much more subject to the limitations of geography.

Nonetheless, is the method universally useful? Rapid improvements in the technology of communications and transport, and the cheap cost of energy due to the utilisation of fossil fuels, have combined to shrink distances and rendered the limitations of climate and geography much less restrictive. What held true in the time of Philip II (and throughout most of human history!) no longer holds true today.

Singapore and Geography

Heng uses the perspective of the longue durée to argue that ‘the Singapore of today is very much the same as it has been throughout its documentable history: a port-city par excellence’. The problem with that statement is that it is lacking in nuance: Singapore today is no longer simply a port-city. If anything, the modern economic miracle of Singapore provides a striking illustration of triumphs over geographical limitations achieved through the application of industrial technology and enabled by a fortunate historical conjuncture in the cheapness and availability of energy. After 1965, the economy was completely restructured away from providing entrepôt trade and servicing the British military base and towards industry and later, services, becoming an export-led economy with the help of substantial foreign investment. Today, manufacturing accounts for 26% of GDP, financial services 22%.

It can still be argued that Singapore remains defined by its port. The value of our trade is four times that of our GDP, and the fact that we are dependent on exports to an international market was starkly illustrated by how badly affected we are by the current economic downturn. Nonetheless, there are qualitative differences which make a straightforward comparison untenable. Colonial Singapore and pre-colonial Temasek were entrepôts servicing the archipelago, China and India. Goods were imported, and then exported with little or not refinement or addition of value. The value of an entrepôt depended on the reluctance of merchants to travel the entire length of a shipping route, and this depended in turn on geographical factors. Singapore’s entrepôt port derived its value from the seasonality of the monsoon and the diversity of trading destinations, which made sailing to all of them directly an impractical proposition. Chinese junks caught the northeast monsoon winds in winter, and, instead of continuing on towards India or the archipelago, spent the time trading their goods in Singapore for Indian or archipelagic goods collected over the previous year, before sailing before the southwest monsoos in spring and summer. Indian merchants did the same, but in the opposite direction.

This contrasts starkly with the port of modern Singapore, which depends much less on the geographical cycles of the longue durée. Instead, as anyone who did Social Studies in school would know, the value of our port depends primarily on the strengths of our industries and labour force, which add value onto imports of raw materials and export finished products in demand elsewhere, and only secondarily on geographical factors, such as our position astride the Middle East-East Asian trade route, which puts us at an advantage with regards to oil refining. This is the reason why the modern port of Singapore imports from and exports to all parts of the world (indeed, the far-away USA are our second-largest trade partner).

I am not arguing that geography plays no role at all. Singapore has always been well-placed to be a port. It has a navigable coastline, deep harbours, and a good position along an important waterway. Little wonder, therefore, it has had a port for a large portion of its history. Nonetheless, to claim that modern Singapore is still ‘very much the same’ as pre-modern Temasek simply because they both had ports promotes a misunderstanding, or at best a very simplistic understanding, of history: there are very different economic bases to the pre-modern and colonial ports, and the modern port of Singapore.

The reason for this mistake is obvious. Heng calls on us to ‘put aside… contextual issues such as technology’. As we have seen, in modern history at least, technology is not a contextual issue: it has a large impact on the limitations of structure. The resemblance of the port of modern Singapore to that of pre-modern Singapura, therefore, is a superficial one.

It is on the basis of this superficial similarity that the article proceeds to construct even more superficial similarities with little regard for historical nuance, and use all these to justify a policy prescription.


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Meritocracy, not quota

July 6, 2009
Meritocracy, not quota

That's affirmative action the Singapore way, says Shanmugam

By Sue-Ann Chia , SENIOR POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT
Mr K. Shanmugam says that Singapore should have some form of affirmative action to ensure that able people from minority races are in top posts. -- PHOTO: ZAOBAO

LAW Minister K. Shanmugam stands by a controversial suggestion he made six years ago: that Singapore should have some form of affirmative action to ensure that able people from minority races are in top posts.But this must not be done by having quotas or setting aside places for minorities.

'I don't talk about saving so many places for Malays, so many places for Indians, so many places for Chinese. That is the wrong way to go,' he said.

In his vision of affirmative action, meritocracy remains a core principle. Affirmative action is a secondary principle, to ensure what he calls 'diversity'.

Mr Shanmugam, who is also Second Home Affairs Minister, was responding to a question posed by grassroots leader Khartini Khalid, during a dialogue with residents of Punggol Central.

Ms Khartini had asked about his views on affirmative action for the Malay community, which he first made known six years ago in Parliament as a backbencher.

In 2003, in a speech to support the Government's White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiah arrests, the-then Senior Counsel spoke about closing the gap between Malays and other races.

His remarks, which he described as 'mildly heretical', stirred up a storm. Revisiting the issue on Sunday, he reiterated his stance about 'leavening the process of meritocracy' so as to create 'icons' of success who can be 'beacons of hope' for the rest of the community.

Turning to the local Malay community, Mr Shanmugam said it had made 'tremendous' progress in the last six years.

He cited as an example the recent appointment of Brigadier-General Ishak Ismail, the most senior Malay officer in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).

There are also other symbols of success within the community, from top scoring students to top professionals, he said.

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No magic wand

July 6, 2009
DIALOGUE WITH PUNGGOL CENTRAL RESIDENTS
No magic wand
It needs 3 parties: New residents and S'poreans to bond, and Govt to provide framework
By Sue-Ann Chia , SENIOR POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT
On his visit to Punggol Central on Sunday, Mr Shanmugam encouraged both Singaporeans and new residents to mingle and get to know one another. -- PHOTO: LIANHE ZAOBAO

HOW to get new immigrants integrated into Singapore society? Law Minister K. Shanmugam, who is also Second Home Affairs Minister, said on Sunday the Government cannot be the 'total solution' to this.

Rather, the tricky problem takes three parties to solve - Singaporeans, who have to be welcoming; new immigrants, who have to adapt to a new culture; and the Government, which has to provide a framework for people to bond.

Mr Shanmugam stressed this three-way partnership at an hour-long dialogue with Punggol Central residents, in response to a question from a resident who wanted to know what can be done to integrate the growing pool of new immigrants here.

Last year, 20,513 foreigners became Singapore citizens, while 79,167 took up permanent residency.

It is the people themselves - Singaporeans and new residents - who have to mingle and forge friendships with one another, said Mr Shanmugam. Singaporeans, he said, should welcome 'newer residents with an open heart and help them integrate, bring them in'. This is already taking place in housing estates, he noted.

Mr Charles Chong, an MP for Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC, had last month estimated that up to 10 per cent of the residents in some blocks could be permanent residents or new citizens.

Noting how Singaporeans and new residents have come together to be involved in the programme for his ministerial visit, Mr Shanmugam added: 'That is a way integration takes place, at the ground level.'

As for new settlers, his advice was that they should 'take the attitude that they want to integrate'. He added: 'When we approve PRs, we look for people who can integrate, and can add value. We want to bring in people who will create more jobs...help the economy and all of us.'

The Government, on its part, will also find ways to help people interact, such as by setting up business organisations and social networks, he added.

The National Integration Council was set up earlier this year, headed by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, the Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports. Mr Shanmugam, who is part of the council, noted that there is no such thing as instant integration. 'You can't just wave a magic wand and say, 'okay, integration'. It takes many years,' he said.


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