Market chatter over green shoots and rising prices has fueled a bear market rally that won't last, despite policymaker 'noise.'By Andy Xie, guest economist to Caijing and a board member of Rosetta Stone Advisors Ltd. (Caijing Magazine) A combination of growth optimism and inflation fear has catapulted asset markets in the past few weeks. These two concerns should drive markets in different directions: Inflation fear, for example, should limit room for stimulus and prompt stock markets to retreat. But the investment camps expressing these opposite concerns go separate ways, each pumping up what seems believable. As a result, stock and commodity markets are mirroring the behavior seen during the giddy days of 2007.
Regardless of what investors or speculators say to justify their punting, the real driving force is the return of animal spirit. After living in fear for more than a year, they just couldn't sit around any longer. So they decided to inch back. The resulting market appreciation emboldened more people. All sorts of theories began to surface to justify the market trend. Now that the rising trend has been around for three months globally and seven months in China, even the most timid have been unable to resist. They're jumping in, in droves.
When the least informed and most credulous get into the market, the market is usually peaking. A rising economy and growing income produces more funds to fuel the market. But the global economy is now stuck with years of slow growth. Strong economic growth won't follow the current stock market surge. This is a bear market rally. People who jump in now will lose big.
Over the past three weeks, the dollar dove while oil and treasury yields surged. These price movements exhibited typical symptoms of inflation fear, which is complicating policymaking around the world. The United States, in particular, could be bottled in. The federal government's fiscal stimulus and liquidity pumping by the Federal Reserve are twin instruments for propping up the bursting U.S. economy. The fiscal deficit could top US$ 2 trillion (15 percent of GDP) in 2009. That would increase by one-third the total stock of federal government debt outstanding. Such a massive amount of federal debt paper needs a buoyant Treasury to absorb. If the Treasury market is a bear market, absorption becomes a huge problem.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently visited China to, among other things, persuade China to buy more Treasuries. According to a Brookings Institution estimate, China holds US$ 1.7 trillion in U.S. Treasuries and GSE paper (about 15 percent of the total stock). If China stops buying, it could plunge the Treasury market into deep bear territory. If China does not buy, the Treasury market will get worse. But China can't prop up the market by buying.
In the past few years, purchases by central banks around the world have dominated demand for Treasuries. Central banks have been buying because their currencies are linked to the dollar. Hence, such demand is not price sensitive. The demand level is proportionate to the U.S. current account deficit, which determines the amount of dollars held by foreign central banks. The bigger the U.S. current account deficit, the greater the demand for Treasuries. This is why the Treasury yield was trending down during the bulging U.S. current account deficit period 2001-'08.
This dynamic in the Treasury market was changed by the bursting of the U.S. credit-cum-property bubble. It is decreasing U.S. consumption and the U.S. current account deficit. The 2009 deficit is probably under US$ 400 billion, halved from the peak. That means non-U.S. central banks have much less money to buy, while the supply is surging. It means central banks no longer determine Treasury pricing. American institutions and families are now marginal buyers. This switch in who determines price is shifting Treasury yields significantly higher.
The 10-year Treasury yield historically averages about 6 percent, with about 3.5 percent inflation and a real yield of 2.5 percent. This reflects the preferences of marginal buyers in the United States. Foreign central banks have pushed down the yield requirement substantially over the past seven years. If marginal buyers become American again, as I believe, Treasury yields will surge even higher from current levels. Future inflation will average more than 3.5 percent, I believe. Some policy thinkers in the United States believe the Fed should target inflation between 5 and 6 percent. The Treasury yield could rise to between 7.5 and 8.5 percent from the current 3.5 percent.
A massive supply of Treasuries would only worsen the market. The Federal Reserve has been trying to prop the Treasury market by buying more than US$ 300 billion – a purchase that's backfired. Treasury investors are terrified by the inflation implication of the Fed action. It is equivalent to monetizing national debt. As the federal deficit will remain sky-high for years to come, the monetization could become much larger, which might lead to hyperinflation. This is why the Treasury yield has surged in the past three weeks.
One possible response is to finance the U.S. budget deficit with short-term financing. As the Fed controls short-term interest rates, such a strategy could avoid the pain of high interest rates. But this strategy could crash the dollar.
The dollar index-DXY has fallen 10 percent from the March level, even though the U.S. trade deficit has declined substantially. It reflects the market's expectations that the Fed's monetary policy will lead to inflation and a dollar crash. The cause of dollar weakness is the outflow of U.S. money, in my view. It is the primary cause of a surge in emerging markets and commodities. Most U.S. analysts think the dollar's weakness is due to foreigners buying less of it. This is probably incorrect.
The dollar's weakness can limit Fed policy options. It heightens inflation risks; a weak dollar imports inflation and, more importantly, increases inflation expectations, which can be self-fulfilling in today's environment. The Fed has released and committed US$ 12 trillion (83 percent of GDP) for bailing out the financial system. This massive overhang in money supply could cause hyperinflation if not withdrawn in time. So far, the market is still giving the Fed the benefit of the doubt, believing it will indeed withdraw the money. Dollar weakness reflects the market's wavering confidence in the Fed. If the wavering continues, it could lead to a dollar collapse and make inflation self-fulfilling.
The Fed may have to change its stance, even using token gestures, to assure the market it won't release too much money. For example, signaling rate hikes would soothe the market. But the economy is still in terrible shape; unemployment may surpass 10 percent this year. Any suggestion of hiking interest rates would dampen growth expectations. The Fed is caught between a rock and a hard place.
Oil prices have doubled since a March low, even though global demand continues to decline. The driving forces again are expectations of inflation and a weaker dollar. As U.S.-based funds flee, some of the money has flowed into oil ETFs. This initially impacted futures prices, creating a huge gap between cash and futures prices. The gap increased inventory demand as investors tried to profit from the gap. Rising inventory demand caused spot prices to reach parity with futures prices. Rising oil prices, though, lead to inflation and depress growth. It is a stagflation factor. If the Fed doesn't rein in weak dollar expectations, stagflation will arrive sooner than I previously expected.
Stagflation in the 1970s spawned the development of rational expectation theory in economics. Monetary stimulus works by fooling people into believing in money's value while the central bank cheapens it. This perception gap stimulates the economy by fooling people into demanding more money than they should. Rational expectation theory clarified the underpinning for Keynesian liquidity theory. However, as they say, people can't be fooled three times. Central banks that tried to use stimuli to solve structural problems in the '70s saw their stimuli didn't work. People saw through what they tried again and again, and began behaving accordingly, which translated monetary stimulus straight into inflation without stimulating economic growth.
Rational expectation theory discredited Keynesian theory and laid the foundation for Paul Volker's tough love policy, which jagged up interest rates and triggered a recession. The recession convinced people that the central bank was serious about cooling inflation, so they adjusted their behavior accordingly. Inflation expectations fell sharply afterward. The credibility that Volker brought to the Fed was exploited by Alan Greenspan, who kept pumping money to solve economic problems. As I have argued before, special factors made Greenspan's approach effective at the same. Its byproduct was asset bubbles. As the environment has changed, rational expectation theory will again exert force on the impact of monetary policy.
Movements in Treasury yields, oil and the dollar underscore the return of rational expectation. Policymakers have to take actions to dent the speed of its returning. Otherwise, the stimulus will lose traction everywhere, and the global economy will slump. I expect at least gestures from U.S. policymakers to assuage market concerns about rampant fiscal and monetary expansion. The noise would be to emphasize the "temporary" nature of the stimulus. The market will probably be fooled again. It will fully wake up only in 2010. The United States has no way out but to print money. As a rational country, it will do what it has to, regardless of its rhetoric. This is why I expect a second dip for the global economy in 2010.
While inflation expectations are causing some in the investor community to act, the rest are betting on strong economic recovery. Massive amounts of money have flowed into emerging markets, making it look like a runaway train. Many bystanders can't take it any longer and are jumping in. Markets, after trending up for three months, are gapping up. Unfortunately for the last-minute bulls, current market movements suggest peaking. If you buy now, you have a 90 percent chance of losing money when you try to get out.
Contrary to all the market noise, there are no signs of a significant economic recovery. So-called green shoots in the global economy are mostly due to inventory cycles. Stimuli might juice up growth a bit in the second half 2009. Nothing, however, suggests a lasting recovery. Markets are trading on imagination.
The return of funds flowing into property is even more ridiculous. A property burst usually lasts for more than three years. The current burst is larger than usual. The property market is likely to remain in bear territory for much longer. The bulls are talking about inflation as the bullish factor for property. Unfortunately, property prices have risen already and need to come down even as CPI rises. Then the two can reach parity.
While rational expectation is returning to part of the investment community, most investors are still trapped by institutional weakness, which makes them behave irrationally. The Greenspan era has nurtured a vast financial sector. All the people in this business need something to do. Since they invest other people's money, they are biased toward bullish sentiment. Otherwise, if they say it's all bad, their investors will take back the money, and they will lose their jobs. Governments know that, and create noise to give them excuses to be bullish.
This institutional weakness has been a catastrophe for people who trust investment professionals. In the past two decades, equity investors have done worse than those who held U.S. market bonds, and who lost big in Japan and emerging markets in general. It is astonishing that a value-destroying industry has lasted so long. The greater irony is that salaries in this industry have been two to three times above what's paid in other sector. The key to its survival is volatility. As markets collapse and surge, possibilities for getting rich quickly are created. Unfortunately, most people don't get out when markets are high, as they are now. They only take a ride.
Indeed, most people who invest in the stock market get poorer. Look at Japan, Korea and Taiwan: Even though their per capita incomes have risen enormously over the past three decades, investors in these stock markets lost money. Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for investors to make money in the stock market. Most countries, unfortunately, don't possess the conditions for stock markets to reflect economic growth. The key is good corporate governance. It requires rule of law and good morality. Neither is apparent in most markets.
It's a widely accepted notion that long term stock investors make money. Actually, this is not true. Most companies don't last for more than 20 years. How can long term investment make money for you? The bankruptcy of General Motors should remind people that this notion is ridiculous. General Motors was a symbol of the U.S. economy, a century-old company that succumbed to bankruptcy. In the long run, all companies go bankrupt.
Property on the surface is better than the stock market. It is something physical that investors can touch. However, it doesn't hold much value in the long run either. Look at Japan: Its property prices are lower than they were three decades ago. U.S. property prices will likely bottom below levels of 20 years ago, after adjusting for inflation.
China's property market holds even less value in the long run. Chinese properties are sitting on land leased for 70 years for residential properties and 50 years for commercial properties. Their residual values are zero at the end. The hope for perpetual appreciation is a joke. If you accept zero value at the end of 70 years, the property value should only be the use value during those 70 years. The use value is fully reflected in rental yield. The current rental yield is half the mortgage interest rate. How could properties not be overvalued? The bulls want buyers to ignore rental yield and focus on appreciation. But appreciation in the long run isn't possible. Depreciation is, as the end value is zero.
The world is setting up for a big crash, again. Since the last bubble burst, governments around the world have not been focusing on reforms. They are trying to pump a new bubble to solve existing problems. Before inflation appears, this strategy works. As inflation expectation rises, its effectiveness is threatened. When inflation appears in 2010, another crash will come.
If you are a speculator and confident you can get out before it crashes, this is your market. If you think this market is for real, you are making a mistake and should get out as soon as possible. If you lost money during your last three market entries, stay away from this one – as far as you can.
谢国忠过去几周，市场上弥漫着两种情绪，一种对增长比较乐观，另一种则对通胀表示担忧。担忧通胀，就应该限制刺激政策的空间，并引发股票市场下跌。这两种情 绪使市场朝着不同方向变化。但是，持有这两种观点者是两群不同的人。他们坚持己见，选择不同的投资决策。股票和大宗商品市场，正在上演2007年时令人眼 花缭乱的一幕。
美联储进退两难
无论投资者和投机者怎样证明自己看多市场有多么合理，他们背后的真实动力是“动物精神”，或称“血性”。忧心忡忡一年多之后，这些人再也坐不住了， 决 定重返资产市场。接着，上涨的行情又鼓励更多人入市。各种理论开始浮出水面，证明市场这样的走势是正确的。因为上涨的趋势在全球市场已经有三个月之久，在 中国甚至已经持续了七个月，即便是最胆小的人也忍不住要投身到入市大军。当消息最不灵通、最易轻信他人的投资者入市，通常标志着市场上涨的趋势到了一个 坎。如果经济继续增长，收入增加，将有更多的资金给市场加温。但是，全球经济要缓慢增长许多年。强劲的经济增长，不会在目前股票市场上涨后出现。这是一个 熊市反弹。现在跳进去的人，将损失惨重。
在过去三周，美元走弱，原油价格和美国国债利率上升。这些价格波动，是典型的投资者担忧通胀的表现。他们担忧通胀，使得全世界的政策制定者的处境变 得 复杂。特别是美国，可能会陷入困境。联邦政府实施扩张的财政政策，美联储注入流动性，这是支撑美国经济复苏的孪生工具。2009年，美国的财政赤字可能是 2万亿美元，约占GDP的15％。这将使联邦政府在外流通的债务再添三分之一。如此大规模的债务，需要一个兴旺的债券市场来吸收。如果债券市场低迷，美国 政府债券激增将造成严重的问题。
美国财政部部长盖特纳近日造访中国。他此行的一个目的，是劝说中国购买更多的美国国债。根据布鲁金斯学会的一项研究，中国拥有1.7万亿美元的美国国债和政府支持的证券。如果中国停止购买，会让美国债券市场变得更“熊”。不过，即便中国买了，也无法撑起这个市场。
过去几年，外国央行成为美国债券市场的主要需求方。它们之所以一直在买美国国债，是因为其货币与美元挂钩。因此，这样的需求对价格不敏感，并与美国 的 经常项目赤字成比例，后者决定了外国中央银行拥有的美元数量。美国经常项目赤字越大，对美国国债的需求就越大。2001年至2008年，美国经常项目赤字 不断增加，美国国债的收益率曲线却在下行，原因即在于此。刚性需求使债券的价格增加了。
不过，美国国债市场的动态平衡，被美国的信贷和房地产泡沫爆发改变了。其结果是，美国消费和美国的经常项目赤字都减少了。2009年，美国的经常项 目 赤字很可能低于4000亿美元，为顶峰时期的一半。这意味着外国中央银行用于购买美国国债的钱变少了，但是，供给还在不断增加。这意味着，外国中央银行不 再决定美国国债价格，美国的机构和家庭现在成了能敲敲边鼓的买家。价格决定者的转换，使得美国国债收益率大幅上扬。
十年期的美国国债的收益率历史平均点位是6％，剔除3.5％的通胀，真实收益率是2.5％。这反映出美国买家的偏好。外国中央银行在过去七年将利率 压 得很低。如果买主重新变成美国人，美国国债的收益率会从现在的水平大幅上涨。一些美国政策制定者相信，美联储将通胀目标率定在5％－6％。美国国债收益率 将从目前3.5％的水平上升至7.5％－8.5％。
美国国债的大量供给只会使市场更糟。美联储试着通过购买逾3000亿美元的美国国债来推动债市回暖。但事与愿违。美国国债投资者很害怕美联储的行动 会 导致通胀。这等于将国家债务货币化。由于联邦政府的赤字将在未来几年内保持非常高的水平，货币化的规模以后会更大，从而可能引发恶性通货膨胀。这就是过去 三周美国国债收益率大幅上升的原因。
虽然美国贸易逆差明显减少，但美元指数从3月的峰值跌落约10％。这说明市场预测美联储的政策会导致通胀和美元剧烈贬值。我认为，美元走软的原因是 钱 从美国市场流到其他市场。这是引起新兴市场和大宗商品市场上升的主要原因。多数美国分析师认为，美元的疲软是因为外国人减少了购买量。这很可能不正确。
美元的疲软限制了美联储的政策。疲软的美元积聚了通胀的风险——美元贬值会输入通胀，更重要的是，可能会增加通胀预期，而通胀预期会在目前的环境中 自 我实现。美联储已经释放和承诺了12万亿美元来拯救金融系统，约占GDP的83％。这一大笔货币供给如果不能及时退出，将引发恶性通货膨胀。至今，美联储 仍能从市场对这笔钱是否会被撤回的担忧中受益。美元弱势反映出市场对美联储的信心在摇摆不定。但是，如果市场信心继续摇摆，将会使美元贬值，通胀预期自我 实现。美联储可能必须改变态度，哪怕是象征性的姿态，对市场保证会收回这笔钱。例如，通过提高利率，发出信息，就可以稳定市场的情绪。不过，美国经济依然 在恶化。美国的失业率已经达到9％，今年可能会超过10％。任何提高利率的建议都将会打压增长预期。美联储现在进退两难。
尽管全球需求继续下滑，油价从3月的低位翻了一番，推动因素依然是通胀和美元贬值的预期。因为美国市场的资金“出走”，其中一些流进了石油交易所交 易 基金。起初，期货的价格受到影响，并且现货和期货的价格相差巨大。这个价差增加了存货需求，因为投资者试图从这个价差中获利。增加的存货需求使得现货价格 逐渐接近期货价格。上涨的油价引发通胀，抑制增长。这是滞胀的要素。如果美联储放任美元贬值预期发展，通胀将会比我的预期来得还要早。
20世纪70年代的滞胀，孕育出经济学的理性预期理论。货币政策刺激经济，其实是通过愚弄人们来实现的。中央银行一边使货币贬值，一边却让人们相信 货 币的价值不变。然后，让他们增加对货币的需求，来刺激经济。理性预期理论说穿了凯恩斯流动性理论的底子。但是，正如他们所说，人们不会被一再地愚弄。当中 央银行试图用货币政策解决20世纪70年代的结构问题时，它的刺激政策不再奏效。由于央行不断地用同样的花招，人们看穿了其中的本质，开始理性地行动。这 意味着，增加的货币直接表现在价格上，引发了通胀，没有起到刺激经济的作用。
理性预期理论的诞生降低了凯恩斯理论的信誉，并为保罗·沃尔克那表情严厉、内心仁爱的政策奠定了基础。他的政策是大幅提高利率，并引发衰退。衰退使 得 人们相信中央银行真的要打击通胀，并依此调整自己的行为。随后，通胀预期大幅下降。不过，沃尔克给美联储建立起来的信誉被格林斯潘败光了，他通过注入货币 来解决经济问题。正如我从前指出的，特殊的因素使得格林斯潘的措施一时奏效了。它的副产品是资产泡沫。由于环境变了，理性预期理论将再一次对货币政策的后 果产生影响。
美国国债、油价和美元的走势表现出理性预期回归的迹象。政策制定者必须采取行动，使它回归的速度放慢。否则，刺激将会出轨，全球经济将会暴跌。我预 计，至少美国的政策制定者会摆出姿态，来缓和市场对财政政策和货币扩张的担忧。他们会强调，刺激政策是短期的。市场很可能会再次被愚弄。直到2010 年，它才能完全清醒。美国别无选择，它只能印钱。作为一个理性的国家，它将做它必须做的事情，不管怎样巧言令色。这正是我预计全球经济在2010年二次衰 退的依据。
与市场的所有噪音正相反，市场复苏的明显迹象尚未出现。所谓的全球经济的“绿芽”主要是受到存货周期的影响。刺激政策将使增长在2009年下半年好 一 些。但是，没有什么证据显示经济会持续地复苏。市场在靠着幻想交易。认为资金流回房地产更加可笑。房地产泡沫通常持续三年以上。目前的泡沫比通常要大。房 地产市场很可能保持熊市很久。认为房地产回暖的人指出通胀是房地产转牛的因素。不幸的是，房价已经提高，即便CPI上涨，二者水平接近，房价仍需下调。
大多数投资股市的人实际上变得更穷了。看看日本、韩国和中国台湾。即使它们的人均收入在过去30年大幅增长，投资这些国家和地区股市的投资者依然损 失 了很多钱。经济增长是投资者在股市赚钱的必要而非充分条件。不幸的是，大多数国家的股市并不具备反映经济增长的条件。关键是好的公司治理。这需要法治和良 好的道德规范。但是，这二者中任何一个在大多数市场都不具备。
“长期投资者可以在股市中赚钱”是一个被广泛接受的观念。实际上，这不是真的。大多数公司的经营超不过20年。长期投资怎么能赚钱呢？通用的破产应 该 提醒人们，“长期投资能赚钱”的观念是多么可笑。通用是美国经济的标志，是一家百年老店，却沦落到破产地步。长期看，所有的公司都要破产。
表面上，房地产要比股市好。房地产是有形资产，投资者能触摸到。但是，长期看，它也不能保值。看看日本。它的房地产价格比30年前要低。美国房地产价格将会触底，经通胀因素调整后，也要比20年前的水平低。
长期看，中国的房地产市场保值能力更差。中国的居民住宅的使用期是70年，商业用房是50年。如果在第70年获得零价值，指望永久升值不是一个笑话 吗？房地产的价值只能是过去70年里的使用价值。使用价值完全反映在租赁收益率上。目前的租赁收益率是房贷利率的一半。房地产怎么能不被高估呢？唱多的人 希望买家忽略租房收益，关注升值。但是，升值在长期看是不可能的。贬值倒是有可能，因为中国房地产的期末价值是零。
世界即将面临另一个大麻烦。当上一个泡沫破灭后，世界各国政府没有关注改革，而是力图制造一个更大的泡沫来解决问题。在通胀出现前，这个策略会起作用。随着通胀预期增强，它的效果便会受到威胁。当通胀在2010年出现，另一场海啸不可避免。
如果你是个投机者，并有信心在冲击到来之前退出，那么，这就是你的市场；如果你认为这个市场是真实的，那么，你就正在犯错误，并应该尽快退出；如果你进入市场后，一再地赔钱，那么，你应该远离这个市场。■
