Who holds the sovereign wealth of this nation and why?
Thursday, 30 July 2009,
Sydney Morning Herald:
SINGAPOREANS aren’t usually given to open criticism of the Lee family that has ruled them for half a century. Rightly or wrongly, some presume that in their tightly controlled island state, walls have ears, and one never knows who is listening. But this time it’s different. Singaporeans are deeply displeased with their Prime Minister’s wife, Ho Ching. – “Lumbered with the boss’s wife”.
Kenneth Jeyaretnam
Investment in our only natural resource, our people, could potentially have had a much higher internal rate of return, in the form of a more highly educated workforce, than that achieved by Temasek or GIC on their overseas investments.
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are not a new idea. According to Wikipedia, the term Sovereign Wealth Fund was first used by Andrew Rozanov in an article entitled, ‘Who holds the wealth of nations?’ in the Central Banking Journal of May 2005. A SWF may be broadly defined as a state-owned investment fund composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, property, precious metals or other financial instruments.
Theoretically one can distinguish two types of SWFs. The first, and the oldest form of SWF, is one set up to manage revenues from an exhaustible resource such as oil, or one which derives its assets from government budget surpluses. An example of one based on resources, and arguably the first SWF was the Kuwait Investment Authority, a commodity SWF created in 1953 from oil revenues before Kuwait even gained independence from Great Britain. A more recent example is the Norwegian SWF which was set up primarily to ensure that the wealth represented by Norway’s oil reserves was not squandered on current consumption but turned into financial assets which would benefit future generations.
Temasek could be said to be an example of the first type of SWF. It was set up in 1974 to hold stakes in the various government-controlled companies, such as DBS, SIA and Singapore Technologies, that had previously been held by the Ministry of Finance. The Temasek Holdings website states that, “Our investments are funded through dividends we receive from our portfolio companies, our divestment proceeds, commercial borrowings, a maiden Yankee bond issue in 2005 and occasional asset injections from our shareholder, the Minister for Finance (Incorporated).”
The second type of SWF is one set up to manage a country’s excess foreign exchange reserves. GIC is probably an example of this type of SWF since it was set up in 1981 with the explicit objective of managing our foreign exchange reserves for long-term capital appreciation. I say probably, as there is very little transparency, so it is not clear whether it is also funded by capital injections from the Ministry of Finance in the same manner as Temasek. However a significant portion of its funding may come indirectly from the CPF which invests primarily in debt issued by MOF. No information is available on the current level of assets. The website states only that the investment portfolio is in excess of US$100 billion. However various estimates have put the level of assets at between US$250 and US$330 billion.
Singaporeans need to be asking, particularly in the light of the recent investment losses, why Singapore even has not one, but two, SWFs. Singapore does not meet the criteria for the first type of SWF since we do not need to manage a windfall from any natural resources. If Singapore had expanded its domestic investment and consumption over the last 30 years it would have had smaller current account surpluses and thus smaller foreign exchange reserves needing management. MAS already has sufficient foreign exchange reserves necessary to manage the Singapore dollar. No second SWF was needed to fulfil this function.
Again without transparency we have no breakdown of how much government saving in the form of surpluses has contributed to both Temasek and GIC’s growth over the years. But we do know that the cumulative budget surplus over the last thirty years has been considerable.
Where have these oft lauded budget surpluses come from in the first place. Well we all know how to save money. We cut back on expenditures. When a country cuts back on the absolute basics such as free education for its children then it creates a budget surplus. Let’s make no mistake here. No other First World Nation only has compulsory education up to the end of Primary school and even that only for a very short day and that minimal compulsory education not even free (although heavily subsidised). I am not advocating a welfare state but to put it bluntly, Singaporeans have helped to pay for our enormous overseas investments by forgoing free universal education to secondary level, a national health insurance system and other elements of a social safety net which are characteristic of most countries at Singapore’s level of development
The budget surplus, having been taken from the pockets of Singaporeans, then represents money that not only could have, but should have, been returned to the citizens of Singapore in the form of lower taxes, fees and charges. It could have also been used to finance much higher domestic investment in education or in health and welfare. Their website states that Temasek has achieved an annualized return of 18% since inception though that is based on the March 2008 asset figure of S$185 billion rather than on the current valuation of S$145 billion announced by CEO Ho Ching yesterday. Investment in our only natural resource, our people, could potentially have had a much higher internal rate of return, in the form of a more highly educated workforce, than that achieved by Temasek or GIC on their overseas investments.
Instead of the Government investing our money to pick winners through an industrial strategy there could have been greater incentives for investment and R&D in the private sector which might have led to faster productivity growth and higher levels of real incomes. And even if GIC has not been funded directly by the MOF, the growth of our foreign exchange reserves has come about through chronic external surpluses which represent domestic under-consumption and under-investment.
As a final ignominy, CEO Ho Ching announced on July 29th at the Institute of Policy Studies that Temasek was thinking of allowing Singaporeans to co-invest alongside Temasek sometime in the next ten years. How kind of her. I thought we had already invested as outlined above. The only positive side of this news is that it would presumably force Temasek to be much more transparent about its investment process and corporate governance. In any case any personal financial adviser (and I am not one) would not advise an investment in a company without sufficient transparency that required due diligence.
As we all know, calls on the government for accountability and transparency in its sovereign wealth funds is not new. However; I would go one step further! Many of you know that I gave a speech at the Foreign Correspondents Association lunch on the 2 July 2009. In answer to a question put to me after the lunch I went on record as saying that Singaporeans should be given a direct stake in our SWFs, either through their privatization and the issuance of shares to Singapore citizens or through the explicit linkage of part of the value of these assets to the welfare of Singaporeans, as is done in Norway through the Pension Fund.
To counter one possible objection that our national “crown jewels” could end up being bought by foreigners the government could retain a golden share which would prevent this happening to Temasek’s portfolio of domestic GLCs. Longer term there is no reason for Singapore to continue to run large budget surpluses over the course of an economic cycle.
In conclusion whilst I will not let up on calling on our government for greater transparency and accountability into how it manages our money, I would urge it also to look at credible new proposals such as mine, rather than confining itself to the limited steps outlined by CEO Ho Ching in her speech.
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Friday, July 31, 2009
State coroner records a verdict of suicide in David Widjaja's case
State coroner records a verdict of suicide in David Widjaja's case
By S Ramesh, Channel NewsAsia | Posted: 29 July 2009 1703 hrs
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SINGAPORE: Singapore's state coroner on Wednesday recorded a verdict of suicide in the case of David Widjaja, who was found dead on the grounds of Nanyang Technological University (NTU) on March 2 after stabbing his professor with a knife.
Widjaja, an Indonesian national, was a student in NTU's faculty of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, while Professor Chan Kap Luk was the one supervising Widjaja in his final year project.
State coroner Victor Yeoh took nearly one and a half hours to deliver his 73-page verdict. He concluded that at about 10.25am that day, Widjaja had voluntarily stabbed Chan with a knife in the professor's office.
The coroner added that a struggle followed, and it was possible that Widjaja could have sustained some injuries during the struggle.
Yeoh also concluded that after the incident, Widjaja had walked towards the parapet wall near a link bridge, sat at the edge and then fell to his death on his own.
The coroner also concluded that there was no foul play involved in the incident.
The inquiry into Widjaja's death was held over 10 days with 27 witnesses testifying, including pathologists who carried out the autopsy, police officers at the scene of the incident and NTU students and staff who had witnessed the event.
Much of Wednesday morning's proceedings involved the state counsel rebutting many of the submissions made by the family and its lawyers.
The family had made some final submissions to the court, claiming that the evidence given by some of the witnesses during the 10-day inquiry was untruthful.
Yeoh noted that it is the family's contention that Widjaja was murdered by Chan. However, he explained that the autopsy findings were consistent with the accounts given by several witnesses who saw Widjaja fall on his own.
Dr Marian Wang and Professor Gilbert Lau, who performed the autopsy report on Widjaja, had certified that he had died of multiple injuries.
The coroner noted the family's contention that they would have brought Widjaja's body back to Indonesia for another autopsy if the cause of death was multiple injuries.
However, he stressed that there was no basis for the family to question the integrity of the pathologists in the discharge of their professional duties. He also said he did not find anything suspicious in the way the autopsy was performed.
Yeoh also concluded that Chan was a credible witness, and he had not deliberately concealed anything during the inquiry. The coroner also stated that the relationship between Chan and Widjaja was professional, and that Widjaja was not being singled out by the professor.
Yeoh also noted that it was Widjaja who had stabbed the professor, as only Widjaja's DNA was found on the handle of the knife.
Meanwhile, the family's lawyer Shashi Nathan said the Widjaja family intends to pursue the findings of the coroner back in Indonesia.
- CNA/yb
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Thursday, July 30, 2009
Ho Ching: Rumours 'far from truth'
July 30, 2009
GOODYEAR'S SHOCK EXIT
Rumours 'far from truth'
Temasek CEO Ho Ching dismisses speculation over reasons for departure
| By Fiona Chan | ||
 |  | ST PHOTO: STEPHANIE YEOW |
TEMASEK Holdings chief executive Ho Ching yesterday dismissed rumours in the market about why CEO-designate Charles 'Chip' Goodyear had decided not to take the top post.'I think there has been a lot of speculation,' she said, in her first public words on the topic since Temasek's shock announcement last week of Mr Goodyear's resignation.
'We look at this speculation sometimes with irritation and sometimes with amusement because all of it is very far away from the truth, including those sources who claimed to be familiar with the situation.
'They were obviously not,' she added.
Ms Ho was responding to a question at Wednesday's annual IPS Corporate Associates Lunch, organised by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) at the Four Seasons Singapore. She was the guest of honour.
Mr Goodyear, 51, was to replace Ms Ho, 56, as CEO from Oct 1, until Temasek issued an unexpected statement saying 'strategic differences' had led both the company and Mr Goodyear to change their minds.
Since then, Singapore has been abuzz with speculation over what these strategic differences could be.
News agency Reuters reported that Mr Goodyear's decision was probably made after a board meeting this month at which he suggested proposals and changes that the board did not agree on.
The Wall Street Journal also ran an article citing sources within Temasek who said Mr Goodyear, trying to instil tighter discipline, had fined people for showing up late to internal meetings and had prohibited them from typing messages on their BlackBerrys during meetings.
Temasek had not responded to these rumours and has so far remained tight-lipped on the differences.
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Lumbered with the boss's wife
Lumbered with the boss's wife
Eric Ellis
July 30, 2009SINGAPOREANS aren’t usually given to open criticism of the Lee family that has ruled them for half a century. Rightly or wrongly, some presume that in their tightly controlled island state, walls have ears, and one never knows who is listening.
But this time it’s different. Singaporeans are deeply displeased with their Prime Minister’s wife, Ho Ching. She has run Temasek Holdings, the state-owned fund, since 2002, and has presided over a spectacular series of misjudgments that have lost Singaporeans billions.
There was the murky $3 billion deal she made in Bangkok in 2006, to buy then Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra out of his telco. Ho’s massive plunges into European and American banks ended in tears last year when Temasek lost a third of its $100 billion portfolio. In Australia, Ho lost Temasek’s entire $400 million stake she’d plunged into Eddie Groves’ ABC Learning Centres, among other missteps.
So much for her much-lauded ‘‘Superwoman’’ smarts and vision when the state appointed her, even though her pre-Temasek record at Temasek-owned arms supplier Singapore Technologies was hardly Sorosesque. Today, Singaporeans are sick of Ho and have been for some time. They want her out of Temasek, lest she create any more financial havoc for them.
Except she’s not going. In a February ‘‘transition’’ — not a sacking, as Temasek spun furiously — Ho was supposed to hand over Temasek to Chip Goodyear, the 51-year-old American (and North Melbourne supporter) who pointed BHP-Billiton at China for four years and made billions.
The big idea was that Goodyear would fix the mess Ho made in banking and tilt Singapore into the booming China and India growth stories, which meant placing Temasek at the middle of big regional resources plays. But that, too, has ended in tears, when Temasek last week cited ‘‘strategic differences,’’ announcing it was "mutually agreed" Goodyear would not become CEO.
It seems clear that after five months hanging around the Temasek office, Goodyear has been paid millions for his life-long silence.
But only a few days earlier, Goodyear was doing the rounds of Temasek satellites mapping out his vision. One CEO I spoke to expressed shock, saying he had been on the ‘‘same page’’ as Goodyear and was looking forward to working with him. The implication was clear: Goodyear was a genuine businessperson whereas Ho was not.
That was mid-July. A week later, Chip was chopped. Temasek’s board met the weekend before last, then announced Goodyear was gone. So what happened?
The Government-controlled Straits Times said Goodyear’s proposals to shake up Temasek were viewed as "too risky" by the board. Too risky? Ho’s bad bets in banks lost Temasek around $30 billion. What could be riskier than that?
More likely is the take doing the rounds of Singapore’s banking and business communities. Local insiders, under few illusions that little happens at Temasek without Government say-so, say the Government has been spooked by the arrest in China of Rio-Tinto executive Stern Hu.
Temasek hired Goodyear because they wanted him to do for it what he had done at BHP, expertly play China, which is far more politically important for an Asian nation such as tiny Chinese-dominated Singapore than it is for a global mining giant. But after the Chinese Government arrested Hu and sent a message it was taking back control of its resources management, it wouldn’t do now, they say, for a foreigner who knows so much about Chinese resources to front mostly Singapore Inc’s ambitions in China.
The handling of Goodyear has deeply embarrassed Singapore and seems to give lie to the fiction that Temasek operates transparently and separately from Government policy. And knowing how deep runs the anger among its readers that Ho has squandered a big chunk of their nest egg, even the normally lap-dog Straits Times was moved to ask how ‘‘private sector’’ can Temasek really be, commenting: ‘‘Like it or not, Temasek cannot get away from the fact that it is inextricably linked to the Singapore Government’’.
It’s shaken up the arcane world of sovereign wealth funds too, where Temasek liked to portray itself as the model for emerging wealthy states. Delegations from around the world made pilgrimages to Singapore to see how it was done, how their state’s strategic jewels can be packaged and managed into an investment vehicle that maintained the illusion it was somehow separated from the Government. Journalists describing Temasek as "Government-controlled" invited a welter of complaints to their editors from Temasek’s spinners who demanded it be benignly referenced as an "Asian investment company" with no references to the Government whatsoever, and certainly not to describe the family connections of Ho’s. Failure to comply would mean an outlet would be blackballed by Temasek, which in Singapore ultimately suggests a libel suit no media company has ever won there.
East Timor decided the Temasek model wasn’t for them, and chose a Norwegian-inspired transparent route for its now $6 billion petroleum royalties pile. In many respects, it’s actually a model for Temasek. Certainly, the East Timorese fund made more money than Temasek has recently — it invested in boring US treasury bonds while Ho was plunging billions into Merrill Lynch.
Unsurprisingly, Temasek’s model appeals more to the more authoritarian and less democratic of states, such as Kazakhstan which, like Singapore, is run along family lines.
Now Singapore Inc is in a pickle. It said it wants to internationalise Temasek, and appointing the much-respected Goodyear was a huge – and widely welcomed – statement. Now it’s stuck with the bumbling Ho, for at least another year, which simply deepens the market’s conviction that dealing with Temasek is akin to de facto dealing with the Government.
Temasek says it is continuing its international search for a new boss. But after Goodyear’s bad year at Temasek, why would anyone want to go there?
Eric Ellis is a business writer based in Singapore
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Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Temasek Holdings: Building a Sustainable Institution
Temasek Holdings: Building a Sustainable Institution
Lunch Remarks by Ms Ho Ching
Executive Director and CEO, Temasek Holdings
Institute of Policy Studies
Corporate Associates Lunch
29 July 2009, Singapore
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Professor Tommy Koh, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies,
Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon.
Introduction
1 Temasek celebrated1 its 35th anniversary on 25th June this year.
2 Five years ago, when Temasek turned 30 years old, I was privileged to share some thoughts at an IPS lunch. Today, I am privileged to
have the opportunity again to provide some perspectives on our journey to build a sustainable institution as we move forward.
Institutionalising Discipline
3 Temasek is a long-term investor. As I had outlined five years ago, this means we will act to enhance long-term value, and will not divest for
divestment’s sake. We don’t intend to raid the larder, nor sell the family jewels, for short-term gains. We will jealously guard our interests, and
will invest; rationalise, consolidate or divest where it makes sense, and where we can achieve clear sustainable value.
4 Our goal was to build a robust framework to maintain discipline and deliver value over the long term as a sustainable institution.
5 As one of our founding leaders, Mr S Rajaratnam said in 1966:
“We must learn to do things today
with tomorrow very clearly in our minds.”
6 It has been an intense journey. There was no path, we walked to make the path for ourselves. We unfolded and refined our investment
strategy in public view, even while we were simultaneously transforming our portfolio and upgrading our core engine of people, systems and
processes.
7 In October of 2004, we published our first Temasek Review. As an exempt private company, we were not required to do so. Our core
purpose was not transparency per se, but to instil the discipline, the professionalism and the open willingness to be tested and measured.
8 Such an annual review would serve more than one purpose. It provides a public marker of our performance, whether good or bad. Today,
the market is generally aware that we have had an annual return of about 18% a year since inception. Our year-to-year volatilities are visible.
In our Temasek Review last year, we reported an annual Value-at-Risk of almost S$40 billion last March. This meant a 16% probability for
our portfolio value2 to drop more than $40 billion by March this year. Indeed, it had turned out to be so, and more.
9 Our Temasek Review was also meant to introduce us to our friends and potential partners; as well as to our portfolio companies, and other
interested parties or stakeholders in the market. Our first Temasek Review marked the beginning of a new phase in Temasek’s journey to
engage and be engaged with the wider community.
10 Shortly after, we obtained our credit ratings with two leading international credit rating agencies. These have been based on full
confidential disclosure.
11 We have continued to be credit rated ever since. This establishes a public marker of our financial position and credit risks. Our strategic
actions and commercial choices would be bounded by this clear bright tripwire or public OB marker. Any move to shift our credit risk stance
would require deep and deliberate debate within our Board and senior management.
12 Our credit ratings were followed by an international 10-year US$ bond in September 2005. The bond spreads are a real-time indicator of
our credit risks, much like the role of a singing canary in a coal mine. This was also a deliberate move to create a new group of sophisticated
stakeholders for ourselves.
13 As I have just highlighted, we have today established three sets of public markers; our annual Temasek Review, our credit ratings, and
our bond spreads. They are like the 18th hole in a long game of golf, our credit ratings the tripwires or OB markers, and our bond spreads
the singing canary - they signpost the no-go zones and outline the broad perimeter of our playing field. These are but one strategic facet of
our commitment to build not just for this generation, but to lay the foundations for a robust and disciplined institution for the future.
14 In the same vein, we have applied the highest practical standards of governance upon ourselves, no different from our expectations of our
portfolio companies.
15 One example, as we had explained in 2004, was the process of CEO evaluation and succession planning. We believe it is crucial for any
board to continually review its CEO succession options. To this end, we have put in place an annual CEO succession review with our Board.
This provides the Board with a full view of its options for all contingencies. The first such review for our Board was in early 2005, after we had
done our preliminary work in 2004. Thereafter, our Board has been engaged annually to review potential successors for various time frames;
from an immediate interim need, to longer horizons where we deliberately add promising individuals in their 30s for us to track or bring on
board over time. We include our internal management as well as external candidates on our list, Singaporeans as well as non-Singaporeans,
promising leaders from TLCs3 and non-TLCs.
16 It is through this process that we identified Chip Goodyear as an excellent potential successor.
17 The strength of the Temasek team and the confidence of the Board played a part in our decision to invite Chip to be the next CEO for
Temasek.
18 It is unfortunate that both the Board and Chip recently came to the amicable and mutual conclusion that it was best not to proceed with
the CEO transition. This does not mean, however, that we should stop this discipline of succession review. We will continue to do so,
regardless of who takes the helm as CEO at Temasek. This is part and parcel of our institutional discipline and board governance to build for
the long term.
19 Apart from CEO succession, we have also worked to improve our other systems and processes.
20 To enable us to operate efficiently, effectively and responsively to the market, we are mindful of the continual need to keep our systems
and processes updated and well-honed. This we have been doing and will continue to do.
21 However, one over-riding priority is to expose, train, build up and empower all our staff, young and not so young, experienced and new
alike. This interest in giving our people the maximum opportunity to learn and grow, to stretch and test them, professionally and individually,
is underpinned by our firm belief that our people, equipped with the right values, are the core foundation for Temasek over the long term.
Where it made sense, we were sometimes prepared to sacrifice opportunities when we were not ready to take certain risks. But when it
comes to developing our team, we are almost always prepared to sacrifice some efficiency or effectiveness to maximise training and learning
opportunities for our staff, both individually and as a team. We are prepared to take the short-term inefficiency pains for long-term people
gains.
Growing with Asia
22 I have just outlined how we have built a framework for good governance and discipline, and shared our trade-offs against the goal of
developing people. Meanwhile, we also saw an evolving investment strategy.
23 To understand our opportunities, we stood back and asked ourselves what the key ingredients of our success have been since the
founding of Temasek. We had two important success factors: first, the people with the passion, commitment and capability to think long term
and deliver; and second, the success of Singapore itself. With Singapore’s success, companies like Singapore Airlines, SingTel and PSA4
have both benefited from as well as contributed to Singapore’s success as a business hub and an economy.
24 It is not a surprise that many of our portfolio companies have outgrown Singapore. Singapore Airlines could not have succeeded by flying
between Seletar and Changi. Beyond Singapore, we were confident that the transformation of Asia was going to be an exciting story which
also adds to Singapore’s own growth potential. The Asia story would also significantly multiply the opportunities that we and our TLCs have
had in growing with Singapore. Asia, including Singapore, was where we wanted to be.
25 Thus, we decided to shift our portfolio stance from about 85% exposure to Singapore and the OECD economies. We articulated our Asia
interest in the shape of a re-balanced portfolio transformation, with one third underlying exposure5 to Singapore, one third to the OECD
economies, and a new one third share for the rest of Asia. This is a doubling of our previous exposure to Asia in our portfolio.
26 This projected portfolio shift was not a target cast in stone, but a broad sketch of our risk appetite. We felt comfortable to dial up our risk
exposure by moving into the then emerging Asia, because we already had a stable and low risk portfolio, particularly in our Singapore blue
chips. At the same time, we were also signalling our confidence in the long-term prospects of Asia. We saw four main engines of growth for
ourselves in Asia – from India and South Asia, to ASEAN, from Singapore, to China and North Asia.
27 As a result of Asia’s strength over the last few years, we ended up with a 40% exposure to the rest of Asia, while our OECD exposure,
largely in Australia, shrank to about 20% over the last two years. We mulled over this resultant balance.
28 We remained very comfortable with Asia. We understand that growth will not be a straight line trajectory. We can expect bumps along the
way, but the longer term potential remains strong. By longer term, we mean 20, 30 years. As Asia continues on its development curve, it will
also de-risk. We had also planned to add new exposures such as the Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Russia. This saw us opening
new offices in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, Brazil, last year, after more than a year of analyses and study.
29 After two years of introspection, our conclusion was to maintain our 40:30:20:10 portfolio mix. My friends joked that this sounds like a
football formation. I explained that it signals our continued focus on Singapore at 30% with rest of Asia at 40%, giving us an overall exposure
to Asia, including Singapore, of 70% or more. OECD exposure would be around 20%, plus up to 10% exposure to new geographies like
Latin America, Africa and others.
Building an owner mindset
30 Even as we maintain focus on Asia and add new geographic exposure, we remain obsessed about building our institution for the long
term. A critical element is an owner mindset in our culture. How do we nurture a ‘think-owner, act-owner’ DNA in Temasek?
31 Apart from culture and values, we embarked on developing a compensation framework geared towards a strong alignment with long-term
shareholder value. Compensation philosophy and frameworks are complex subjects which can be emotional. There are no perfect solutions.
The trade-off is how to weigh short-term competitive pressures from the market versus the long-term goal we have set for Temasek. Ideally,
all our employees would “think owner, act owner”, and work as one team. To support this ideal, we lean heavily towards having a wellbalanced
compensation structure which would reinforce a one-team culture, and an incentive philosophy which puts the institution before
self, emphasises long-term over short-term, and aligns employee interests with that of the shareholder.
32 Our compensation framework has two dimensions. One dimension is time. This covers short, medium and long-term pay-out horizons.
The other dimension is the different levels of difficulty to earn out the incentives. One key principle is for our employees to share in the
institution’s performance, both for positive and negative results. We share gains and pains alongside our shareholder. This is in essence
having an owner’s approach to our business and operations.
33 For senior management, the bulk of their incentives are deferred between three to 12 years. Some of these deferred components are
subject to market risks, and rise and fall with Temasek’s total shareholder returns. The remaining components are subject to a “no-floor clawback”
- these deferred components could potentially be totally wiped out if and when we deliver well below our cost of capital target. This
“clawback” feature is tied to the principle of rewarding only for sustainable performance.
34 This return above the risk-adjusted cost of capital is what we call Wealth Added, which we report in our Temasek Review.
35 Returns above the cost of capital target means we have gains to share with our staff. Returns or losses below our risk adjusted cost of
capital hurdle means we have negative bonuses to be distributed. It is a tough challenge to share negative bonuses when we fail to deliver at
least a return to match our cost of capital. It is even tougher to deliver a positive Wealth Added every year.
36 While we are certainly not happy with the negative Wealth Added in March, both last year and this year, this has enabled us to test our
compensation framework through at least one very difficult market cycle. As an example, most of us understand the idea of sharing profits or
gains, but how do we share a negative bonus in an equitable and fair way among our staff? Even though we had delivered almost 7% of
positive total shareholder return as at 31st March last year, this meant a negative Wealth Added. A share of this negative Wealth Added
meant a negative bonus pool. This in turn was allocated among our staff. And so, from CEO to office attendants, all our staff were allocated
negative bonuses last year and will be allocated more negative bonuses this year once we have approved our audited financials.
37 Our experience over the down-cycle also enabled us to rethink and refine some of our incentive elements. These refinements strengthen
the core concept of ensuring that there is, on balance, a strong element of alignment with sustainable long-term shareholder value. In effect,
our incentive system is designed to support that owner mindset among our staff.
Expanding our stakeholder base
38 Last but not least, I would like to touch on one more element of institution building - to build a broad stakeholder base for the institution.
39 While the Minister for Finance (Incorporated) is our formal shareholder, we recognise that the ultimate shareholders of Temasek are the
past, present and future generations of Singapore. As Temasek continues to engage and invest in Asia, we also recognise the wider
community in Asia as part of our stakeholder base. Temasek succeeds because of friends and supporters all over the world. It is in our longterm
interest to contribute steadily to a prospering Asia, a vibrant Singapore and a peaceful world.
40 It is in this context that we had set up Temasek Foundation and Temasek Cares to add substance to our engagement with the wider
community. The business of community engagement is very different from managing money and making investments. Our expertise is not in
community engagement per se, though we have a strong culture of staff volunteerism. We have been very privileged to have the support of
independent, capable and experienced community and business leaders from Singapore and from all over Asia to help evaluate and drive
these engagements within Singapore and across Asia.
41 We set up Temasek Trust two years ago. Governed by a highly distinguished Board of Trustees, the Trust looks after the donated funds.
For every year of positive Wealth Added since 2003, we had committed to set aside a portion for the community. Funding for Temasek Trust
comes from these provisions for the community. In turn, the Trustees will determine how and when they will distribute funds to the various
approved non-profit units to fulfil their various mandates to serve the community. The Temasek Trust and our various non-profit philanthropic
organisations re-affirm our commitment as a corporate citizen to support the continued progress and success of Asia and her people. More
than that, we have created one more group of stakeholders who would be tracking the performance of Temasek closely, benefitting both
from Temasek’s success and contributing to the larger community by sharing that success.
42 Over the longer term, we are exploring the feasibility of creating one more group of stakeholders. We can do this by inviting the public to
co-invest with Temasek. We hope to start this by first piloting the relevant structures and rules of engagement with Temasek and other
sophisticated co-investors. . It is important to test this over at least one market cycle during the next five to eight years. If this pilot is
successful, we may then consider a co-investment platform for retail investors in perhaps eight to ten years’ time. This will add to our
stakeholder base - from shareholder and bondholders, to the boards and employees of Temasek and our portfolio companies, from Temasek
Trust and the non-profit units to our co-investors. A broad base of stakeholders will be part of our ecology for discipline and performance in
the decades ahead.
Redefining our Charter
43 This year is the 35th anniversary for Temasek. In 2002, we launched our inaugural Temasek Charter. It is a living document that outlines
our relationships with our shareholder, portfolio companies, the community and other stakeholders. Our 2002 Charter helped to provide
some compass points as we embarked on our journey into Asia.
44 As we evolved, we had also been reviewing our Charter in close consultation with our shareholder over the last four years. This year, in
conjunction with our 35th anniversary celebrations, we will be releasing our updated Charter. This Charter will remain a living document. It
frames our engagement with our stakeholders, and guides us in our continued journey with Asia and beyond.
Conclusion
45 To conclude: as we gear up for the next phase of our development, we will continue to focus on our core purpose of delivering
sustainable long-term value. We continue to anticipate opportunities, not just within Asia, but also in Latin America and elsewhere too.
46 As an investor with the flexibility of a long or short time horizon, Temasek is focused on the end goal of creating and maximising long-term
shareholder value as an active investor and shareholder of successful enterprises.
47 The Temasek journey will not always be smooth. As we sail in choppy waters, we may need to take shelter if we see dark clouds coming.
We may need to wait for the storm to pass before we continue our journey. Because of the changing winds and shifting currents, we may
have to adjust our sails and tack off-course for a while. Meanwhile, we need to keep our ship in good order and sea-worthy at all times. From
time to time, we may even have to jettison some load, repair some damage or cut some rigging to keep our ship and crew safe. But we aim
to bring everyone home safe, and will maintain discipline for a safe journey.
48 As an institution, we build not just for ourselves, but for our shared future with the wider community and also for our next generation, in
Singapore, in Asia and around the world. This will guide us, and the institution that we in Temasek are working to build, in the years ahead.
49 Thank you.
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Lunch Remarks by Ms Ho Ching
Executive Director and CEO, Temasek Holdings
Institute of Policy Studies
Corporate Associates Lunch
29 July 2009, Singapore
--------------------
Professor Tommy Koh, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies,
Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon.
Introduction
1 Temasek celebrated1 its 35th anniversary on 25th June this year.
2 Five years ago, when Temasek turned 30 years old, I was privileged to share some thoughts at an IPS lunch. Today, I am privileged to
have the opportunity again to provide some perspectives on our journey to build a sustainable institution as we move forward.
Institutionalising Discipline
3 Temasek is a long-term investor. As I had outlined five years ago, this means we will act to enhance long-term value, and will not divest for
divestment’s sake. We don’t intend to raid the larder, nor sell the family jewels, for short-term gains. We will jealously guard our interests, and
will invest; rationalise, consolidate or divest where it makes sense, and where we can achieve clear sustainable value.
4 Our goal was to build a robust framework to maintain discipline and deliver value over the long term as a sustainable institution.
5 As one of our founding leaders, Mr S Rajaratnam said in 1966:
“We must learn to do things today
with tomorrow very clearly in our minds.”
6 It has been an intense journey. There was no path, we walked to make the path for ourselves. We unfolded and refined our investment
strategy in public view, even while we were simultaneously transforming our portfolio and upgrading our core engine of people, systems and
processes.
7 In October of 2004, we published our first Temasek Review. As an exempt private company, we were not required to do so. Our core
purpose was not transparency per se, but to instil the discipline, the professionalism and the open willingness to be tested and measured.
8 Such an annual review would serve more than one purpose. It provides a public marker of our performance, whether good or bad. Today,
the market is generally aware that we have had an annual return of about 18% a year since inception. Our year-to-year volatilities are visible.
In our Temasek Review last year, we reported an annual Value-at-Risk of almost S$40 billion last March. This meant a 16% probability for
our portfolio value2 to drop more than $40 billion by March this year. Indeed, it had turned out to be so, and more.
9 Our Temasek Review was also meant to introduce us to our friends and potential partners; as well as to our portfolio companies, and other
interested parties or stakeholders in the market. Our first Temasek Review marked the beginning of a new phase in Temasek’s journey to
engage and be engaged with the wider community.
10 Shortly after, we obtained our credit ratings with two leading international credit rating agencies. These have been based on full
confidential disclosure.
11 We have continued to be credit rated ever since. This establishes a public marker of our financial position and credit risks. Our strategic
actions and commercial choices would be bounded by this clear bright tripwire or public OB marker. Any move to shift our credit risk stance
would require deep and deliberate debate within our Board and senior management.
12 Our credit ratings were followed by an international 10-year US$ bond in September 2005. The bond spreads are a real-time indicator of
our credit risks, much like the role of a singing canary in a coal mine. This was also a deliberate move to create a new group of sophisticated
stakeholders for ourselves.
13 As I have just highlighted, we have today established three sets of public markers; our annual Temasek Review, our credit ratings, and
our bond spreads. They are like the 18th hole in a long game of golf, our credit ratings the tripwires or OB markers, and our bond spreads
the singing canary - they signpost the no-go zones and outline the broad perimeter of our playing field. These are but one strategic facet of
our commitment to build not just for this generation, but to lay the foundations for a robust and disciplined institution for the future.
14 In the same vein, we have applied the highest practical standards of governance upon ourselves, no different from our expectations of our
portfolio companies.
15 One example, as we had explained in 2004, was the process of CEO evaluation and succession planning. We believe it is crucial for any
board to continually review its CEO succession options. To this end, we have put in place an annual CEO succession review with our Board.
This provides the Board with a full view of its options for all contingencies. The first such review for our Board was in early 2005, after we had
done our preliminary work in 2004. Thereafter, our Board has been engaged annually to review potential successors for various time frames;
from an immediate interim need, to longer horizons where we deliberately add promising individuals in their 30s for us to track or bring on
board over time. We include our internal management as well as external candidates on our list, Singaporeans as well as non-Singaporeans,
promising leaders from TLCs3 and non-TLCs.
16 It is through this process that we identified Chip Goodyear as an excellent potential successor.
17 The strength of the Temasek team and the confidence of the Board played a part in our decision to invite Chip to be the next CEO for
Temasek.
18 It is unfortunate that both the Board and Chip recently came to the amicable and mutual conclusion that it was best not to proceed with
the CEO transition. This does not mean, however, that we should stop this discipline of succession review. We will continue to do so,
regardless of who takes the helm as CEO at Temasek. This is part and parcel of our institutional discipline and board governance to build for
the long term.
19 Apart from CEO succession, we have also worked to improve our other systems and processes.
20 To enable us to operate efficiently, effectively and responsively to the market, we are mindful of the continual need to keep our systems
and processes updated and well-honed. This we have been doing and will continue to do.
21 However, one over-riding priority is to expose, train, build up and empower all our staff, young and not so young, experienced and new
alike. This interest in giving our people the maximum opportunity to learn and grow, to stretch and test them, professionally and individually,
is underpinned by our firm belief that our people, equipped with the right values, are the core foundation for Temasek over the long term.
Where it made sense, we were sometimes prepared to sacrifice opportunities when we were not ready to take certain risks. But when it
comes to developing our team, we are almost always prepared to sacrifice some efficiency or effectiveness to maximise training and learning
opportunities for our staff, both individually and as a team. We are prepared to take the short-term inefficiency pains for long-term people
gains.
Growing with Asia
22 I have just outlined how we have built a framework for good governance and discipline, and shared our trade-offs against the goal of
developing people. Meanwhile, we also saw an evolving investment strategy.
23 To understand our opportunities, we stood back and asked ourselves what the key ingredients of our success have been since the
founding of Temasek. We had two important success factors: first, the people with the passion, commitment and capability to think long term
and deliver; and second, the success of Singapore itself. With Singapore’s success, companies like Singapore Airlines, SingTel and PSA4
have both benefited from as well as contributed to Singapore’s success as a business hub and an economy.
24 It is not a surprise that many of our portfolio companies have outgrown Singapore. Singapore Airlines could not have succeeded by flying
between Seletar and Changi. Beyond Singapore, we were confident that the transformation of Asia was going to be an exciting story which
also adds to Singapore’s own growth potential. The Asia story would also significantly multiply the opportunities that we and our TLCs have
had in growing with Singapore. Asia, including Singapore, was where we wanted to be.
25 Thus, we decided to shift our portfolio stance from about 85% exposure to Singapore and the OECD economies. We articulated our Asia
interest in the shape of a re-balanced portfolio transformation, with one third underlying exposure5 to Singapore, one third to the OECD
economies, and a new one third share for the rest of Asia. This is a doubling of our previous exposure to Asia in our portfolio.
26 This projected portfolio shift was not a target cast in stone, but a broad sketch of our risk appetite. We felt comfortable to dial up our risk
exposure by moving into the then emerging Asia, because we already had a stable and low risk portfolio, particularly in our Singapore blue
chips. At the same time, we were also signalling our confidence in the long-term prospects of Asia. We saw four main engines of growth for
ourselves in Asia – from India and South Asia, to ASEAN, from Singapore, to China and North Asia.
27 As a result of Asia’s strength over the last few years, we ended up with a 40% exposure to the rest of Asia, while our OECD exposure,
largely in Australia, shrank to about 20% over the last two years. We mulled over this resultant balance.
28 We remained very comfortable with Asia. We understand that growth will not be a straight line trajectory. We can expect bumps along the
way, but the longer term potential remains strong. By longer term, we mean 20, 30 years. As Asia continues on its development curve, it will
also de-risk. We had also planned to add new exposures such as the Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Russia. This saw us opening
new offices in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, Brazil, last year, after more than a year of analyses and study.
29 After two years of introspection, our conclusion was to maintain our 40:30:20:10 portfolio mix. My friends joked that this sounds like a
football formation. I explained that it signals our continued focus on Singapore at 30% with rest of Asia at 40%, giving us an overall exposure
to Asia, including Singapore, of 70% or more. OECD exposure would be around 20%, plus up to 10% exposure to new geographies like
Latin America, Africa and others.
Building an owner mindset
30 Even as we maintain focus on Asia and add new geographic exposure, we remain obsessed about building our institution for the long
term. A critical element is an owner mindset in our culture. How do we nurture a ‘think-owner, act-owner’ DNA in Temasek?
31 Apart from culture and values, we embarked on developing a compensation framework geared towards a strong alignment with long-term
shareholder value. Compensation philosophy and frameworks are complex subjects which can be emotional. There are no perfect solutions.
The trade-off is how to weigh short-term competitive pressures from the market versus the long-term goal we have set for Temasek. Ideally,
all our employees would “think owner, act owner”, and work as one team. To support this ideal, we lean heavily towards having a wellbalanced
compensation structure which would reinforce a one-team culture, and an incentive philosophy which puts the institution before
self, emphasises long-term over short-term, and aligns employee interests with that of the shareholder.
32 Our compensation framework has two dimensions. One dimension is time. This covers short, medium and long-term pay-out horizons.
The other dimension is the different levels of difficulty to earn out the incentives. One key principle is for our employees to share in the
institution’s performance, both for positive and negative results. We share gains and pains alongside our shareholder. This is in essence
having an owner’s approach to our business and operations.
33 For senior management, the bulk of their incentives are deferred between three to 12 years. Some of these deferred components are
subject to market risks, and rise and fall with Temasek’s total shareholder returns. The remaining components are subject to a “no-floor clawback”
- these deferred components could potentially be totally wiped out if and when we deliver well below our cost of capital target. This
“clawback” feature is tied to the principle of rewarding only for sustainable performance.
34 This return above the risk-adjusted cost of capital is what we call Wealth Added, which we report in our Temasek Review.
35 Returns above the cost of capital target means we have gains to share with our staff. Returns or losses below our risk adjusted cost of
capital hurdle means we have negative bonuses to be distributed. It is a tough challenge to share negative bonuses when we fail to deliver at
least a return to match our cost of capital. It is even tougher to deliver a positive Wealth Added every year.
36 While we are certainly not happy with the negative Wealth Added in March, both last year and this year, this has enabled us to test our
compensation framework through at least one very difficult market cycle. As an example, most of us understand the idea of sharing profits or
gains, but how do we share a negative bonus in an equitable and fair way among our staff? Even though we had delivered almost 7% of
positive total shareholder return as at 31st March last year, this meant a negative Wealth Added. A share of this negative Wealth Added
meant a negative bonus pool. This in turn was allocated among our staff. And so, from CEO to office attendants, all our staff were allocated
negative bonuses last year and will be allocated more negative bonuses this year once we have approved our audited financials.
37 Our experience over the down-cycle also enabled us to rethink and refine some of our incentive elements. These refinements strengthen
the core concept of ensuring that there is, on balance, a strong element of alignment with sustainable long-term shareholder value. In effect,
our incentive system is designed to support that owner mindset among our staff.
Expanding our stakeholder base
38 Last but not least, I would like to touch on one more element of institution building - to build a broad stakeholder base for the institution.
39 While the Minister for Finance (Incorporated) is our formal shareholder, we recognise that the ultimate shareholders of Temasek are the
past, present and future generations of Singapore. As Temasek continues to engage and invest in Asia, we also recognise the wider
community in Asia as part of our stakeholder base. Temasek succeeds because of friends and supporters all over the world. It is in our longterm
interest to contribute steadily to a prospering Asia, a vibrant Singapore and a peaceful world.
40 It is in this context that we had set up Temasek Foundation and Temasek Cares to add substance to our engagement with the wider
community. The business of community engagement is very different from managing money and making investments. Our expertise is not in
community engagement per se, though we have a strong culture of staff volunteerism. We have been very privileged to have the support of
independent, capable and experienced community and business leaders from Singapore and from all over Asia to help evaluate and drive
these engagements within Singapore and across Asia.
41 We set up Temasek Trust two years ago. Governed by a highly distinguished Board of Trustees, the Trust looks after the donated funds.
For every year of positive Wealth Added since 2003, we had committed to set aside a portion for the community. Funding for Temasek Trust
comes from these provisions for the community. In turn, the Trustees will determine how and when they will distribute funds to the various
approved non-profit units to fulfil their various mandates to serve the community. The Temasek Trust and our various non-profit philanthropic
organisations re-affirm our commitment as a corporate citizen to support the continued progress and success of Asia and her people. More
than that, we have created one more group of stakeholders who would be tracking the performance of Temasek closely, benefitting both
from Temasek’s success and contributing to the larger community by sharing that success.
42 Over the longer term, we are exploring the feasibility of creating one more group of stakeholders. We can do this by inviting the public to
co-invest with Temasek. We hope to start this by first piloting the relevant structures and rules of engagement with Temasek and other
sophisticated co-investors. . It is important to test this over at least one market cycle during the next five to eight years. If this pilot is
successful, we may then consider a co-investment platform for retail investors in perhaps eight to ten years’ time. This will add to our
stakeholder base - from shareholder and bondholders, to the boards and employees of Temasek and our portfolio companies, from Temasek
Trust and the non-profit units to our co-investors. A broad base of stakeholders will be part of our ecology for discipline and performance in
the decades ahead.
Redefining our Charter
43 This year is the 35th anniversary for Temasek. In 2002, we launched our inaugural Temasek Charter. It is a living document that outlines
our relationships with our shareholder, portfolio companies, the community and other stakeholders. Our 2002 Charter helped to provide
some compass points as we embarked on our journey into Asia.
44 As we evolved, we had also been reviewing our Charter in close consultation with our shareholder over the last four years. This year, in
conjunction with our 35th anniversary celebrations, we will be releasing our updated Charter. This Charter will remain a living document. It
frames our engagement with our stakeholders, and guides us in our continued journey with Asia and beyond.
Conclusion
45 To conclude: as we gear up for the next phase of our development, we will continue to focus on our core purpose of delivering
sustainable long-term value. We continue to anticipate opportunities, not just within Asia, but also in Latin America and elsewhere too.
46 As an investor with the flexibility of a long or short time horizon, Temasek is focused on the end goal of creating and maximising long-term
shareholder value as an active investor and shareholder of successful enterprises.
47 The Temasek journey will not always be smooth. As we sail in choppy waters, we may need to take shelter if we see dark clouds coming.
We may need to wait for the storm to pass before we continue our journey. Because of the changing winds and shifting currents, we may
have to adjust our sails and tack off-course for a while. Meanwhile, we need to keep our ship in good order and sea-worthy at all times. From
time to time, we may even have to jettison some load, repair some damage or cut some rigging to keep our ship and crew safe. But we aim
to bring everyone home safe, and will maintain discipline for a safe journey.
48 As an institution, we build not just for ourselves, but for our shared future with the wider community and also for our next generation, in
Singapore, in Asia and around the world. This will guide us, and the institution that we in Temasek are working to build, in the years ahead.
49 Thank you.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=34199.3
Temasek's Portfolio down $40b
July 29, 2009
Portfolio down $40b
 | | Temasek had S$185 billion in assets as of end-March 2008, which fell to S$127 billion as of November 2008. -- ST PHOTO: TAN SUAN ANN |
SINGAPORE state investor Temasek said its portfolio slid by at least $40 billion, or more than a fifth, in the year to March but it will stick with banks and sees opportunities in food and energy.
| RELATED LINKS
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The fund saw potential in Asia and Latin America and was comfortable with financial services as its core portfolio holding, despite being hurt by the market meltdown last year after its high profile investments in Western banks, CEO Ho Ching said on Wednesday.
'At this point, we are still comfortable with the financial sector as a sector that reflects the key economies we are interested in,' she said at a lunch talk organised by the Institute of Policy Studies think-tank.
She acknowledged, however, that the increased regulation of the financial sector may result in the rate of returns falling.
'In terms of sectors specifically, we are agnostic, we don't have a sectoral target,' she said, adding the fund would look at food and energy but without giving further details.
These were the first public comments by Ms Ho, also the wife of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, after Temasek said last week that Charles 'Chip' Goodyear will not become CEO due to differences over strategy.
With 40 per cent of its holdings in financials, Temasek's portfolio lost nearly a third in the eight months to November, sparking unprecedented criticism in Singapore about its strategy. Ms Ho did not give the exact portfolio level as of March 2009.
'In our Temasek Review last year, we reported an annual value-at-risk of almost $40 billion last March. This meant a 16 per cent probability for our portfolio value to drop more than $40 billion by March this year. Indeed, it has turned out to be so, and more,' said Ms Ho in her speech.
Temasek had S$185 billion in assets as of end-March 2008, which fell to S$127 billion as of November 2008.
Mr Goodyear was widely expected to trim Temasek's financial holdings and move aggressively into commodities and energy and into emerging market infrastructure and consumer retail sectors, analysts and bankers have said. Ms Ho said Temasek would continue to look at internal and external candidates for her replacement.
Mr Goodyear's departure came less than six months after he was named by Temasek as the sovereign wealth fund's first foreign CEO. He would have replaced Ms Ho on Oct 1. -- REUTERS
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NTU student's death: It's suicide
July 29, 2009
NTU student's death
It's suicide
| By Kimberly Spykerman | ||
 | | The coroner's inquiry into the engineering student's death turned up strong evidence that Mr Widjaja (pictured) had been planning to kill himself - a possibility his family has repeatedly dismissed. -- PHOTO: COURTESY OF THE WIDJAJA FAMILY |
STATE coroner on Wednesday recorded a suicide verdict on the death of Nanyang Techological University (NTU) undergrad David Widjaja, who jumped from a campus block after allegedly stabbing his professor in his office with a kitchen knife..
A bloody Widjaja, 21, an Indonesian, was seen leaving the office of NTU professor Chan Kap Luk. Several witnesses who had testified earlier said they saw the student thrust himself off the bridge on March 2.
The coroner's inquiry into the engineering student's death turned up strong evidence that Mr Widjaja had been planning to kill himself - a possibility his family has repeatedly dismissed.
The inquest was told that months before he fell to his death on campus,Mr Widjaja was searching the Internet for ways to commit suicide and murder.
Text fragments gleaned from the undergraduate's laptop show he used search engine Google to look for 'a good way to commit suicide' and also the 10 most common suicide methods.
He also searched for murder methods and spent some time at a website titled How To Get Away With Murder.
Senior Staff Sergeant Joe Ng Suan Teck, who conducted a forensic examination of Mr Widjaja's black Lenovo laptop's contents, told the court that the text fragments he had extracted included Internet searches and links to websites pertaining to both suicide and murder.
His examination of the laptop also threw up what appears to be a suicide note.
The unsigned document, titled Last Words, was created on Jan 25 and left unamended.
In the note, which begins 'If this e-mail is sent, that means I am no longer in this world', the writer painted a picture of an unhappy family situation, saying he became 'hardened' and stopped crying after he turned 16. 'I just don't have any more tears for me to shed for other people.'
The writer said he 'found life much more difficult and complicated' after entering university.Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Nuance, a so-called memo and threats: Letter from Thio Li-Ann
Nuance, a so-called memo and threats: Letter from Thio Li-Ann
Source: TODAY
I WRITE to clarify a few points in "Former NMP calls off professorship at NYU"(July 24).
First, the online petition asserting I was an "opponent of human rights" over-simplistically assumes "gay rights are human rights".
Certain countries legally recognise the controversial idea of "gay rights", but this is not a universally accepted human right. Further, the idea of "gay rights" may cover anything from prohibiting workplace discrimination (which I support) to same-sex marriage (which I oppose).
Nuance is needed; simplification is sensationalistic.
Can a capitalist teach Marxism? Could someone who supports the death penalty (which many at New York University disagree with) teach human rights?
There is no settled theory of the source of human rights; many competing interpretations exist. There are core (prohibiting torture) and contested (same-sex marriage, euthanasia) rights.
Second, no 18-page rebuttal was sent to the NYU law faculty. I do not know who posted the so-called "18-point memo" circulating online. This was an internal email I wrote in response to a non-law NYU staffer's email copied to the Dean (who made no response) and others, strongly criticising my appointment.
This was just one of the hostile, often vulgar messages I received, some insulting my intellect, gender, ethnicity and country.
I sought to clarify misrepresentations and rebut potentially defamatory allegations made to personnel involved in the Global Faculty programme which invited my visit.
It is disappointing the NYU law dean would label my response "offensive" and "hurtful", while ignoring the offensive, hurtful and even threatening messages directed against me.
To say I was "disappointed by the hostility" minimises the virulence of the attacks I received. A cursory glance at the invective online explains why many friends worried for my safety.
An American NYU alumnus wrote to the NYU law dean (copied to me), saying he had the impression the dean was "not troubled by the kind of atmosphere" that I was "expected to endure" had I decided to teach at NYU.
Some NYU faculty, staff and students also sent supportive emails; a gay New Yorker apologised for the bullying tactics of certain activists who did not represent him.
Academic freedom dissipates in a hostile environment - by this I do not mean mere viewpoint disputation. Why prejudicially assume I would create "an unwelcoming atmosphere" in class, as opposed to politicking students or frosty faculty members?
Why assume I would not permit free discussion when it is "political correctness" which chills free debate? An email from a Harvard law graduate noted of this affair: "Things just got a little bit darker down at NYU."
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Monday, July 27, 2009
Should foreign activists fund S'pore civil groups?
| Netizens' speculation that Swedish activist offers money to non-political groups raises debate | |||||
| Should foreign activists fund S'pore civil groups? | |||||
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THIS issue cropped up after a Swedish human rights activist met a former nominated member of parliament (NMP).
It set netizens talking. Allegations flew online that the Swede may have offered funding, a claim both men denied. Eventually, ex-NMP Siew Kum Hong made a police report. Why the online fuss? Local political parties are banned from receiving foreign donations, but civil society organisations (CSOs) are not. (See report, top of facing page.) The NMP is not a member of any political party. So, should CSOs be considered political entities and be subject to the same rules, as some actively work to influence policies? Civil activists here say CSOs struggle to find local funding and so may have to consider foreign donors. However, they agree that CSOs also need to be transparent about their source of funding and be savvy enough to question the agenda of the donors. So what was the agenda of the Swedish activist, Mr Johan Skarendal? He is a member of the Swedish International Liberal Centre (Silc), whose avowed goal, as stated on its website, is 'to strengthen organisations and support individuals who develop and promote democracy and human rights'. Mr Skarendal, 29, is in charge of Silc activities in Singapore and the group is affiliated to the Liberal Party, one of the four political parties in the Swedish government since 2006. The group has extensive reach globally and funds acitivities which promote its goals. However, in May, Mr Skarendal denied he was on a funding trip here. He described his visit in April as 'fact-finding'. He declined comment for this report. He said then: 'I wanted to learn about how prominent Singaporeans involved in civil society viewed the human rights issues in Singapore.' Former NMP Braema Mathi said it would be good for civil society organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs) to be savvy enough to see the strings attached before deciding to take the cash. Ms Mathi is the chairman of a local human rights organisation called Maruah (Malay for dignity). Members of Maruah were approached by Mr Skarendal too. Ms Mathi said not all local groups may be savvy enough. 'You have every right to reject the donor. Yes, there can be conditions, but you also have to look around and see if you are keen on those conditions,' she said. 'If those conditions don't align with what you do, then you have to reject the donor.' She pointed out that she once declined a partnership with a local group when she found out the funds came with a religious agenda. The key thing is to be transparent about the funds, said Ms Mathi. The rules for foreign funding of local political parties here are clear. The Political Donations Act bans political parties and organisations from receiving foreign donations. But could foreign groups influence politics through non-political donations using civil societies as a front? After all, NGOs have shown they can spark change here. Said Dr Gillian Koh, a public policy expert at the Institute of Policy Studies: 'Civil society is very much part of the political landscape in Singapore, as it is elsewhere.' She raised the examples of the Nature Society's robust and ultimately successful campaign to save Pulau Ubin's Chek Jawa and Unifem's advocacy for tougher laws against sex crimes against children. But she pointed that the potential influence of overseas groups on groups here may be overplayed. 'They may be inspired by certain ideals, but it's not as though they are so easily swayed by foreigners - as if our civil society is ready to be colonised by civil society somewhere else,' she said. Singapore Management University law lecturer Eugene Tan said no CSO would be breaking the law by virtue of receiving foreign funding as long as they are not recognised as a political organisation. Duty to reveal But he said they have an 'ethical duty' to say who funds them so people who give donations can make an informed opinion about the group's motives. He said there are many groups coming from the West that promote so-called democratic agendas, that may be at odds with the local context. Mr Skarendal's Silc, for example, has a declared liberal democratic focus. 'It doesn't mean that just because (a CSO) receives foreign funding, it would do the funding agency's bidding,' Prof Tan said. He added: 'But with perceptions, you cannot blame people if they were to take the view that this group is supporting a particular cause partly or doing something because of the foreign funder. 'It doesn't matter if it's foreign or local, but when it comes to foreign sources of funding, that would raise a potential red flag, because a foreign funding agency may have motives that may not go well with local interests.' Ms Mathi said finding funds is tough for an advocacy-based group like hers (as opposed to a direct-service volunteer welfare organisation like a charity). While in other countries, an advocacy group can survive purely working on research and advocacy, it's hard here, she said. Local groups including foundations, tend to be wary of supporting advocacy groups since these groups are primarily asking for change - often change to government's policies, she said. The potential donors see it as a risky investnment because they may not know how far a CSO will push the line, and it may return to haunt the donor. She also pointed out that international organisations and foundations find it hard to build a case to give aid to a CSO in Singapore, as they see us as a developed country. One group currently looking for funds is socio-political blog The Online Citizen, which put up a page asking for donations on 13 Jul. TOC managing editor Andrew Loh declined to comment. Gay rights activist Alex Au, who is also a member of Maruah, however, didn't think there was any issue with foreign funding. 'Politics in a global world is globalised. To some extent, Singapore politics cannot be totally restricted to Singaporeans - that's a fact of life,' he said. In this interconnected world, Mr Au said that human beings have responsibility for other human beings. But he agreed that funding sources should be as open as possible. 'Any organisation that takes a public profile should act in a way that is in the interest of accountability, to a reasonable extent,' he said. Who did Swedish activist meet here? IN ABOUT a one-week period in April, Swedish activist Johan Skarendal met an array of Singapore liberals. They include filmmakers Martyn See and Seelan Palay, Myanmar activist Myo Myint Maung, and Mr Andrew Loh and MrChoo Zheng Xi of socio-political blog The Online Citizen. Others included activist Alex Au from gay movement People Like Us and lawyer Peter Low. They are all active members of civil society. Mr See said he met Mr Skarendal over drinks in town in a casual setting and the topic was mainly his experience with the Films Act. The Act bans party-political films and films considered to be against the public interest. Mr See has had two of his films banned, one on Singapore Democratic Party chief Chee Soon Juan and the other, a documentary on former political detainee Said Zahari. 'I got the sense he was trying to write a book or something,' he said. He said he meets representatives of foreign organisations 'all the time' and although it's fine to exchange information, he would reject foreign funding for his films. Overseas Burmese Patriots spokesman Myo Myint Maung said he was introduced to MrSkarendal by Mr Palay, and there were five Myanmar activists at the meeting, himself included. They spoke about their activities here. 'I think they would like to find out a way to help and to give some support of any kind that they could, for the cause of Burma, democracy and human life in Burma,' he said. Funding didn't come up since his group's activities are self-supporting, he said. He added: 'I don't think he's providing foreign funding to Singaporeans, but more like workshops, moral and technological support - that kind of thing.' Gay rights activist Mr Au said they spoke about social change and politics here. 'He asked us a number of questions, and we answered,' he said. Lawyer Mr Low said he met Mr Skarendel with NMP Siew Kum Hong and MrLeong Sze Hian, president of the Society of Financial Service Professionals. He said there are always people coming to Singapore and asking about what's happening. 'Foreign observers, they don't just ask ministers and members of the establishment, but also people who are perceived as anti-establishment,' he said. But The New Paper understands MrSkarendal did not meet any minister or 'members of the establishment'. Mr Low is the lawyer representing the Far Eastern Economic Review in the ongoing defamation suits brought against the journal by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. He added that foreign NGOs funding people to attend training courses or conferences or seminars overseas is common. He himself travelled to Strasbourg, France, for an Asia-Europe Foundation (Asef) conference a few months ago when his airfare and accommodation were sponsored. The Singapore Government is one of Asef's financial contributors. Fact-finding Activist Mr Palay, who was present at several of the meetings, would say only that MrSkarendal came on a fact-finding mission. Mr Palay had held a one-man protest outside the Malaysian High Commission in January last year. He was involved in an attempt to stage a protest during the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting here in 2006. All those interviewed denied being offered funds by Mr Skarendal, who is not new to Singapore. A self-described good friend of opposition politician Chee Soon Juan, Mr Skarendal has been involved with the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) chief's work in human rights and the promotion of liberal democracies. Just how close is the relationship and has Mr Skarendal funded Mr Chee's non-political agenda? The Swede would not say. Ignoring the question, he merely replied earlier that he considered Mr Chee a good friend and someone who had written a testimonial for his studies in Taiwan. Their relationship goes back to 2003. After Mr Chee visited Sweden in February that year, the SDP's youth wing organised a conference here in July. Swedish politicians were among the guests. Mr Skarendal helped to distribute literature and also gave a lecture. Mr Chee also spoke at the conference, which was sponsored by Swedish-based institutions including SILC. It was co-organised with the Sweden-Singapore Initiative for Democracy (SSID). On SDP's website, the party says it is affiliated or working in close cooperation with several organistions including SSID, which is also funded by SILC. Rules on raising funds A MINISTRY Of Home Affairs spokesman said: 'The Registry of Societies does not generally regulate the source of funds of societies. 'Societies should make provision for this in their own constitutions and comply with their own internal controls. 'However, societies must ensure that their funding is from legal sources and that applicable laws regulating funding are complied with. 'Societies that have been gazetted as political associations under the Political Donations Act or are registered charities with Charities Unit (Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports) are subject to the respective regulatory requirements. 'If societies wish to raise funds from the public, they need to seek a fund-raising permit from either Charities Unit or Police Licensing Unit, depending on the nature of the fund-raising event.' http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=33960.1 |
Saturday, July 25, 2009
CAMBRIDGE RACIAL ROW: Obama admits mistake
July 25, 2009
CAMBRIDGE RACIAL ROW
Obama admits mistake
 | | Mr Obama made a rare foray into the political minefield of race relations, saying police acted 'stupidly.' -- PHOTO: AP |
WASHINGTON - BARACK Obama sought on Friday to extricate himself from the first race row of his presidency, saying he regretted having said a white policeman acted 'stupidly' in arresting a black Harvard professor.
Mr Obama, the nation's first African American president, spoke at a surprise appearance before reporters in the White House barely two hours after angry police in Cambridge, Massachusetts, demanded he say sorry for linking the professor's arrest to racial tensions.
Mr Obama said he had phoned the arresting officer, Sergeant James Crowley, and expressed regret for 'an impression that I was maligning the Cambridge police department or Sergeant Crowley specifically'.
'I could have calibrated those words differently and I told this to Sergeant Crowley.' The row, which has the potential to torpedo Mr Obama's carefully crafted image as the country's first post-racial president, started last week when police briefly detained Harvard professor, Henry Louis Gates.
Mr Gates was arrested after a neighbour saw him breaking into his house and mistakenly reported a burglary. An altercation followed in which Prof Gates accused police of racist treatment and was charged with disorderly conduct.
Mr Obama, who is a friend of Prof Gates, made a rare foray into the political minefield of race relations, saying police acted 'stupidly.' He also raised the painful issue of police discrimination against non-whites.
The White House refused to characterise Friday's statement as an apology and Mr Obama stuck by the substance of his original comments made at a press conference on Wednesday.
'The fact that this has become such a big issue I think is indicative of the fact that race is still a troubling aspect of our society,' Mr Obama said.
'Be mindful of the fact that because of our history, because of the difficulties of the past, you know, African Americans are sensitive to these issues,' he urged.
'And even when you've got a police officer who has a fine track record on racial sensitivity, interactions between police officers and the African American community can sometimes be fraught with misunderstanding.'
He also said both the police and Prof Gates had 'overreacted.' -- AFP
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Friday, July 24, 2009
Singapore's Goodbye Guy
| Singapore's Goodbye Guy |
| Written by Our Correspondent | |
| Thursday, 23 July 2009 | |
 Temasek's ex-New Boss is Out the Door The resignation of Charles "Chip" Goodyear halfway through the period between his appointment in March as chief executive designate of Temasek and his assumption of the post in October is yet another illustration of a long established principle: never disagree with a member of the ruling family. Whether or not he was a good choice for the job, the appointment of this investment banker and former boss of BHP-Billiton was hailed as a sincere effort to bring fresh thinking to the management of a massive fund which had suffered badly from Ho Ching's overenthusiasm for financial sector – particularly western financial sector – assets. Not only were many of these acquired at high prices, some such as Barclays and Bank of America (which had acquired the bankrupt Merrill Lynch) were sold off near the bottom of the market earlier this year while with UBS Temasek had to help out with rescue packages. Ho Ching herself seemed to recognize that someone with wider experience of the world might be needed to run a fund which now has two-thirds of its assets outside Singapore. But acceptance in theory and practice can be very different. Exactly what Goodyear was proposing to do when he became actual chief executive is not clear. Some suggest he wanted to move into resources, others that he wanted to shake up the managements of the local state owned entities which are a major part of his portfolio but also the holy of holies for the small group of top bureaucrats who run things on behalf of the Lees. But one thing is clear: there is no such thing as being chief executive of one of the myriad state enterprises in Singapore if a Lee family member, naturally supported by the cohorts of intelligent yes-men, has a different view. That has now been shown to be as much the case with Temasek as it was when Lee Kuan Yew's daughter Lee Wei Ling had a policy dispute with a distinguished UK neurologist, Simon Shorvon, hired to head up Singapore's National Neuroscience Institute of which she was a director. She of course knew far more about neurology than he did and he was hounded out of Singapore and subject to the usual travesty of justice handed out by Singapore authorities in cases involving the Lees. Investigations by the UK's General Medical Council, later endorsed by the High Court, cleared Shorvon of any misconduct. He is now a professor at University College London. Foreign media continue to lap up Temasek's propaganda about its longer-term performance. One that surely ought to know better is the Lex column in the Financial Times which like to think of itself as rigorously analytical. It simply repeats the claim that Temasek's total return has averaged 18 percent since inception and 9 percent over the past decade. No attempt there to analyze Temasek's skimpy accounts -- for example to query the prices at which state assets were injected into it, or to ask about unconsolidated, unlisted subsidiaries such as Astrea which borrowed US$810 million to invest in private equity funds at the height of the fund bubble. A real story about Temasek might earn a writ, or the expulsion of the correspondent, or a quiet ban on Singaporean companies advertising in the paper. Quite how badly Temasek has done is hard to figure out because the data presented is scanty and unconsolidated. For example, in 2007-08 the value of its portfolio increased by 13 percent to S$185 billion but it is unsure how much of that was simply a capital injection from the government. Meanwhile Temasek's local portfolio has been persistently trimmed and now represents only 33 percent of assets. Of course it may make more sense to invest in faster-growing countries rather than in low-growth Singapore where there are few new opportunities for a company which already controls so much. Nevertheless it hard not to conclude that some of these sales, such as the December 2008 sale of PowerSeraya to Malaysia's YTL for S$3.8 billion are not partly designed to generate capital profits readily available from long-held local assets. The kid-gloves approach by the FT to Temasek is in keeping with its past groveling behavior. following comments on Temasek, Remember this from September 29, 2007, which Asia Sentinel reported on October 17 of that year:
This innocuous comment produced the following absurd apology and yet more libel proceeds for the Lees.
Doubtless the FT will apologize in a similar way to Kim Jong Il if the North Koreans can afford to buy enough ads in the pink paper. http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=33731.3 |
HK banks agree to compensate minibond investors $813 mln
HK banks agree to compensate minibond investors $813 mln
HONG KONG, July 22 (Reuters) - Hong Kong's securities watchdog said on Wednesday that 16 banks had agreed to pay about HK$6.3 billion ($813 million) to compensate eligible investors who lost money on structured products or minibonds offered by collapsed U.S. bank Lehman Brothers.
"The agreement that we have reached today will enable the vast majority of investors who hold minibonds to receive a substantial return of their capital," said Securities and Futures Commission Chairman Martin Wheatley.
"The total amount that they'll receive will be equal to or greater than what they could otherwise recover at current market values," he told reporters following an SFC meeting with the banks.
More than 30,000 Hong Kong residents ploughed nearly $2.5 billion into the derivative products which failed as Lehman Brothers collapsed last September.
If the agreement is accepted by investors, "the vast majority of them will be able to get back 70 percent or more of their original investments," Financial Secretary John Tsang said in a statement following the SFC announcement.
The agreement will put an end to more than 10 months of distress for investors, and will also enable the banks to resume their normal operation, Tsang added.
Many of the investors blamed the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) for allowing local banks to sell the products without making investors aware they were risky products. They took to the streets, staging a number of protests in the past year and prompting a government inquiry.
The HKMA and the Securities and Futures Commission have since made separate recommendations on how to better protect investors. They include forcing banks to separate their deposit-taking and retail investment businesses.
Minibond distributors Sun Hung Kai Financial (0086.HK: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and KGI Asia earlier this year agreed to compensate investors in full.
Investors in Singapore and Indonesia also lost money on the products. Singapore investors have only been compensated for about a third of their investments. (US$1 = HK$7.75) (Reporting by Nerilyn Tenorio, Donny Kwok and Susan Fenton , Editing by Tomasz Janowski)
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Thursday, July 23, 2009
Ideal govt - balanced model
July 22, 2009
Ideal govt - balanced model
| By Aaron Low | ||
 | | What would not work, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stressed, is to simply rely on the simplistic approach that 'if you develop, you will need democracy. --ST PHOTO: AZIZ HUSSIN |
SINGAPORE'S model of governance is one that tries to achieve a balance between delivering quality leadership and giving people the opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with Government policies, said Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.
It is a system that has worked well and one that has not let the people of Singapore down, he told a German newspaper.
'How do you keep a system which delivers an outstanding quality of leadership and government, and yet at the same time, have free play and the opportunity for people to say, 'I want this government, but I do not like this policy or the other'?'
The ideal system, he said, balances both. It delivers a good government, while providing for aspirations to be fulfilled and voices - the full range of them - to be articulated.
'This is the ideal,' he said in an interview published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on July 14.
The newspaper wanted to know if Singapore would become 'even more democratic' in future, as it had recently relaxed its rules on public assemblies and was introducing changes to the political system to enable more opposition voices in Parliament.
In his reply, Mr Lee said Singapore, like other countries, is feeling its way forward in establishing a system that works best for it.
What would not work, he stressed, is to simply rely on the simplistic approach that 'if you develop, you will need democracy.'
Singapore did not believe in the Western liberal democratic model which developed in the last half-century as 'the pinnacle of human achievement and the solution for the whole of the world', he said.
He cited the case of Indonesia and how in 1997, the International Monetary Fund wanted to change the system of governance there.
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Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Temasek and Charles Goodyear agree not to proceed with CEO appointment
Temasek and Charles Goodyear agree not to proceed with CEO appointment
Posted: 21 July 2009 1756 hrs
SINGAPORE: Temasek Holdings and Charles ("Chip") W. Goodyear have mutually agreed not to proceed with the CEO appointment that was to have taken effect on 1 October 2009.
Mr Goodyear was appointed a member of the Board of Directors of Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited on February 1 and CEO-Designate on March 1 to succeed Ms Ho Ching as CEO.
In a news release issued on Tuesday evening, Temasek said that four months into the leadership transition, the Board and Mr Goodyear concluded and accepted that there were differences regarding certain strategic issues that could not be resolved.
In light of the differences, both parties decided that it was in their mutual interests to terminate the leadership transition process and hence the executive relationship with effect from 15 August 2009.
Mr Goodyear will also step down from the Temasek Board, effective the same date.
Chairman of Temasek Holdings, Mr Dhanabalan was quoted in the news release as saying, "It is with much regret that both Chip and the Board have accepted that it is best not to proceed with the leadership transition.
"We wish Chip all the best in his future endeavours, and are happy that Ho Ching has agreed to continue as executive director and CEO."
Mr Goodyear who voiced regret at being unable to continue with the leadership transition described Temasek as having "a fantastic platform". Elaborating on the point, Ms Ho Ching said she hopes to complete the initiatives that started by Mr Goodyear.
"In the short time with us, Chip has started a number of initiatives which I believe will help strengthen the Temasek platform. I am sorry he is unable to continue with the leadership transition," she said.
Mr Goodyear began his career at Kidder, Peabody where he advised corporations on mergers and acquisitions, and financing.
The former president of Goodyear Capital Corporation and former executive vice president and chief financial officer of Freeport-McMoRan Inc had also served as the chief executive and executive director, Chairman of the Office of Chief Executive for BHP Billiton.
Responding to Channel NewsAsia's queries, Temasek chairman S Dhanabalan explained that the differences between Temasek and Mr Goodyear are not the issue, but they have helped both sides to arrive at the decision not to continue with the CEO appointment.
Mr Dhanabalan said: "The differences in and of themselves are not the issue but they have helped both the Board and Chip to assess that it is in our mutual interest not to continue with the planned leadership transition."
He said that in the short time with Temasek, Mr Goodyear had started a number of initiatives with the objective to further strengthen the foundation of the firm, in terms of policies, work processes and systems. - CNA/vm
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Posted: 21 July 2009 1756 hrs
SINGAPORE: Temasek Holdings and Charles ("Chip") W. Goodyear have mutually agreed not to proceed with the CEO appointment that was to have taken effect on 1 October 2009.
Mr Goodyear was appointed a member of the Board of Directors of Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited on February 1 and CEO-Designate on March 1 to succeed Ms Ho Ching as CEO.
In a news release issued on Tuesday evening, Temasek said that four months into the leadership transition, the Board and Mr Goodyear concluded and accepted that there were differences regarding certain strategic issues that could not be resolved.
In light of the differences, both parties decided that it was in their mutual interests to terminate the leadership transition process and hence the executive relationship with effect from 15 August 2009.
Mr Goodyear will also step down from the Temasek Board, effective the same date.
Chairman of Temasek Holdings, Mr Dhanabalan was quoted in the news release as saying, "It is with much regret that both Chip and the Board have accepted that it is best not to proceed with the leadership transition.
"We wish Chip all the best in his future endeavours, and are happy that Ho Ching has agreed to continue as executive director and CEO."
Mr Goodyear who voiced regret at being unable to continue with the leadership transition described Temasek as having "a fantastic platform". Elaborating on the point, Ms Ho Ching said she hopes to complete the initiatives that started by Mr Goodyear.
"In the short time with us, Chip has started a number of initiatives which I believe will help strengthen the Temasek platform. I am sorry he is unable to continue with the leadership transition," she said.
Mr Goodyear began his career at Kidder, Peabody where he advised corporations on mergers and acquisitions, and financing.
The former president of Goodyear Capital Corporation and former executive vice president and chief financial officer of Freeport-McMoRan Inc had also served as the chief executive and executive director, Chairman of the Office of Chief Executive for BHP Billiton.
Responding to Channel NewsAsia's queries, Temasek chairman S Dhanabalan explained that the differences between Temasek and Mr Goodyear are not the issue, but they have helped both sides to arrive at the decision not to continue with the CEO appointment.
Mr Dhanabalan said: "The differences in and of themselves are not the issue but they have helped both the Board and Chip to assess that it is in our mutual interest not to continue with the planned leadership transition."
He said that in the short time with Temasek, Mr Goodyear had started a number of initiatives with the objective to further strengthen the foundation of the firm, in terms of policies, work processes and systems. - CNA/vm
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Monday, July 20, 2009
Singapore central bank suffers net loss of over 6 bln USD
Singapore central bank suffers net loss of over 6 bln USD
SINGAPORE, July 16 (Xinhua) -- The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country's central bank, said on Thursday that it has suffered a net loss of 9.2 billion Singapore dollars (about6.43 billion U.S. dollars) in the last financial year ending March2009.
The loss represents about 3.5 percent of the central bank's average total assets, the MAS said in a press conference to unveil its annual report. In the previous year, the profits stood at 7.44 billion Singapore dollars (about 5.2 billion U.S. dollars).
MAS attributed the loss to the current severe economic crisis which has "pared back about 80 percent of the gains in the preceding two years."
Against the tumultuous external backdrop, the Singapore economy contracted sharply, posting an output loss of around 10 percent from its peak a year ago, the steepest decline in its history, by the first quarter this year, it added.
It also warned that despite improved performance in the second quarter, "The domestic economy is likely to witness slow and uneven growth, rather than sharp and decisive recovery."
For the economy as a whole, Singapore has revised the official growth forecast for 2009 to between minus 6.0 to minus 4.0 percent.
MAS also said that given weak demand and easing domestic costs, inflation for the year is expected to come in between minus 0.5 percent and plus 0.5 percent.
Going forward, the central bank says it is aiming to strengthen Singapore's financial system, of which one of the measures is to enhance the MAS standing facility to provide liquidity to financial institutions, adding that it will also review and intensify its supervision on financial institutions in the sale of investment products.
MAS also said it will continue to keep a strong balance sheet. It has increased its total capital and reserves to 28.74 billion Singapore dollars (about 20 billion U.S dollars), representing close to 11 percent of MAS' total assets, to help Singapore navigate through a potentially volatile financial market environment and to help stabilize its financial system should the need arises.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=33508.1
SINGAPORE, July 16 (Xinhua) -- The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country's central bank, said on Thursday that it has suffered a net loss of 9.2 billion Singapore dollars (about6.43 billion U.S. dollars) in the last financial year ending March2009.
The loss represents about 3.5 percent of the central bank's average total assets, the MAS said in a press conference to unveil its annual report. In the previous year, the profits stood at 7.44 billion Singapore dollars (about 5.2 billion U.S. dollars).
MAS attributed the loss to the current severe economic crisis which has "pared back about 80 percent of the gains in the preceding two years."
Against the tumultuous external backdrop, the Singapore economy contracted sharply, posting an output loss of around 10 percent from its peak a year ago, the steepest decline in its history, by the first quarter this year, it added.
It also warned that despite improved performance in the second quarter, "The domestic economy is likely to witness slow and uneven growth, rather than sharp and decisive recovery."
For the economy as a whole, Singapore has revised the official growth forecast for 2009 to between minus 6.0 to minus 4.0 percent.
MAS also said that given weak demand and easing domestic costs, inflation for the year is expected to come in between minus 0.5 percent and plus 0.5 percent.
Going forward, the central bank says it is aiming to strengthen Singapore's financial system, of which one of the measures is to enhance the MAS standing facility to provide liquidity to financial institutions, adding that it will also review and intensify its supervision on financial institutions in the sale of investment products.
MAS also said it will continue to keep a strong balance sheet. It has increased its total capital and reserves to 28.74 billion Singapore dollars (about 20 billion U.S dollars), representing close to 11 percent of MAS' total assets, to help Singapore navigate through a potentially volatile financial market environment and to help stabilize its financial system should the need arises.
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MM Lee says Singapore needs to do more to achieve nationhood
MM Lee says Singapore needs to do more to achieve nationhood
By Valarie Tan, Channel NewsAsia | Posted: 18 July 2009 2257 hrs
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SINGAPORE: Despite achieving harmony amongst all races in Singapore, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said on Saturday that the country is still a work-in-progress when it comes to nationhood.
"Are we a nation yet? I will not say we are. We're in transition," he said at the Orange Ribbon Celebrations which centres on racial harmony.
The minister mentor reminded audiences that cohesiveness was not achieved overnight in Singapore.
"Will we always progress? Provided we know where we are and what we have to do to get there, we can easily regress," he warned. "All you need is to have the JI (plant) a bomb or an explosion at an MRT station."
The JI or Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group is among the chief suspects behind Friday's bomb attacks on luxury hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Mr Lee said leaders in Singapore will have to continue to work closely with grassroots to achieve the goal of nationhood.
"Please remember this is an ideal which we may not completely reach, but because we have this ideal, we'll continue to make progress," he said.
On new citizens, Mr Lee is confident that Singapore's education system, where English is the main language, will help assimilate the young ones into society.
"That is the nature of our system, we can 'culturalise' them. We can 'Singaporeanise' their habits, their values. We won't force them to change their religion," the minister mentor said.
Mr Lee added that it may take Singapore another 44 years to become a nation, but once the country gets there, it will have a better society.
- CNA/so
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